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BELGRADE: THE CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED STATES
INTRODUCTION

The Belgrade Conference of the Heads of State or Government
of Non-Aligned Countries was held at a time-early September, 1961when U.S.opinion, both official and public, was never more favorable
toward the so-called "neutrals." When Mr. Khrushchev suddenly
announced the resumption of nuclear weapons tests and thus gave the
25 heads of state assembled in Yugoslavia a clear opportunity to use
their independent judgment and their "moral force," the Conference
displayed a curious and dismaying double standard. Editorial writers
and cartoonists in the West pointedly criticized the "noncommitted."
Even the friends of these countries in the West were seriously jolted.
This pamphlet describes the origins of the Belgrade Conference
and its accomplishments. There is no attempt to gloss over the double
standard on the nuclear test issue, but an effort is made to explain it.
In addition, the pamphlet puts the Conference's reaction to the resurnption of nuclear tests in perspective. The heads of state made many wise
decisions on a host of other issues. The non-aligned states are likely to
continue as a formidable political force in the world and at the United
Nations, if not a third bloc.
This pamphlet is dedicated to U Thant of Burma. He was a
delegate to the Belgrade Conference on the eve of the tragic death of
Dag Hammarskjold. His experience, temperament, and non-alignment
combined to make him the unanimous choice of the 100 or more member
nations-many aligned--as Acting Secretary General of the United
Nations.
-Homer A. Jack

Dr. Jack represented the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy at
the Belgrade Conference. He was accorded official observer status, the only
American to be given this opportunity. He also attended the Bandung Conference
in 1955 as a journalist and the first All-African People's Conference in 1958 as
a fraternal delegate from the American Committee on Africa. Since 1959 Dr. Jack
has been a nongovernmental observer at the United Nations.
Published by the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, 17 East 45th
Street, New York 1, N.Y. Quantity prices on request. Printed in the U.S.A.
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FROM BANDUNG TO BELGRADE

"This Conference is not an isolated event in the emergence
of the new social forces. It is one of a series of major
events in this process of emergence."-President Sukarnz
The Asian-African Conference, held in Bandung, Indonesia, in
April, 1955, was one of the most important international gatherings
in the twentieth century. Conceived by the Columbo Powers (India,
Indonesia, Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon), the Conference was an effort
to consolidate the multiple revolutions in Asia against colonialism,
racism, poverty, and disease and to spread these revolutions to Africa.
Present were the leaders of the ex-colonial world: Nehru, Chou En-lai,
Sukarno, Nasser, U Nu, and many others. Some 27 independent Asian
and African nations attended the Conference as well as representatives
from two African colonies on the threshold of independence: the Gold
Coast (Ghana) and the Sudan.
Although the Bandung Conference communique provided for
consultations among the five Columbo powers to convene a second
conference, none has been called. Indonesia has continued to encourage
the convening of a second Bandung, but so far without success. Several
of the original Columbo powers were hesitant to form a bloc; neither
did they want to face the difficult decision of whether or not the
U.S.S.R. should be invited to any second Asian-African conference. One
continuing outcome of the original Bandung Conference has been,
however, the close and fruitful cooperation of the Asian-African states
as a caucussing group at the U.N.
Since Bandung, Africa has come into the world spotlight. At the
Bandung gathering, Africa was quite a junior partner, with only six
nations in attendance: Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast, Liberia, Libya, and
Sudan. With the birth of many new nations, the African states since
1958 have held their own continental conferences. In April, 1959,
Prime Minister Nkrumah of Ghana convened the first Conference of
Independent African States. Eight nations were present: Egypt, Ethiopia,
Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia. This stimulated
the formation of the African caucussing group at the U.N. The second
meeting of this group was held in Addis Ababa in June, 1960, with a
wider representation. In December, 1958, Prime Minister Nkrumah
sponsored, also in Accra, the first All-African People's Conference. This
has been called "the African Bandung," for present were such nationalist
leaders as Tom Mboya, H. Karnuzu Banda, Patrice Lumumba, Kenneth
Kaunda, Holden Roberto, and Joshua Nkomo, as well as Prime Minister
Nkrumah. A permanent secretariat was established and subsequent con-

ferences were held in Tunis in January, 1960, and in Cairo in March,
1961.
The unity of Africa has since been fragmented, partly in trying
to solve its own problems, especially the Congo. After a preliminary
meeting in Abidjan in October, 1960, organized by F6lix HouphouetBoigny of the Ivory Coast, statesmen of many of the African nations
formerly part of the French Community met in Brazzaville in December,
1960. They tried to find a common judgment on the tangled Congo
situation and to induce France to reach a solution to the Algerian
impasse. The "Brazzaville Twelve" included Cameroun, Chad, Central
African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast,
Malagasy, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta. In January,
1961, still another grouping of African states met in Casablanca, partly
on Morocco's urging to support her opposition to the seating of Mauritania at the U.N. and partly to bolster the Stanleyville regime in the
Congo. Present were the heads of state of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco,
and the U.A.R., and representatives from Libya, Ceylon, and the Provisional Government of Algeria. Still a third configuration of African
states gathered in Monrovia, Liberia, in May, 1961. Present were the
heads of state of Cameroun, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Ivory
Coast, Liberia, Malagasy, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierre
Leone, Somalia, Togo, and Upper Volta. In addition, delegations were
present from Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Gabon, and Libya.
This was the largest official African conference to date, although
Nkrumah of Ghana, Nasser of the U.A.R., and S6kou Tour6 of
Guinea were conspicuously absent.
In the autumn of 1960, when the heads of many states converged
upon New York for the opening of the 15th UN. General Assembly,
the prime ministers of Ghana, India, Indonesia, U.A.R., and Yugoslavia
found themselves working together in an unsuccessful effort to induce
Premier Khrushchev and President Eisenhower to enter into talks to
lessen world tensions. On this occasion seeds were planted for further
contact amongst these leaders of the non-aligned nations. This desire
for closer consultations was enhanced by the travels of President Sukarno
and President Tito, especially the visits of the latter to Accra in March,
1961, and to Cairo in April, 1961.
Thus on April 26, 1961, presidents Nasser and Tito addressed
a communication to the heads of state of 21 non-aligned countries
suggesting that, in view of world developments and increasing tension,
a conference be held before the convening of the lGth U.N. General
Assembly. President Sukarno of Indonesia associated himself with the
need for such a meeting. On May 18,1961, the presidents of Yugoslavia,
Indonesia, and the U.A.R., joined by the Prime Minister of India,
invited a number of non-aligned countries to send representatives to a

preparatory meeting in Cairo beginning on June 5th. To this meeting
came delegates from the following states: Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Cuba, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq,
Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, U.A.R., Yemen, and Yugoslavia. Nine of these countries were represented by their foreign
ministers. Brazil sent an observer.

PREPARING FOR BELGRADE

"When I had the honor of meeting my friend, President
Josip Broz Tito, in Cairo and Alexandria at the end of
April, this year, we reviewed the international situation
since our last meeting in September, 1960, at the General
Assembly session."-President Gumal Abdel NasJer
At the preparatory meeting in Cairo, it was initially proposed that
immediate invitations go to the Provisional Government of Algeria
and to the Stanleyville (Gizenga) regime of the Congo. After prolonged
discussion, it was the preponderant view that the Provisional Government of Algeria be invited to the preparatory sessions, but that the
Stanleyville government be invited only to the Conference. Several
delegations strongly dissented from this decision and this controversy
led to a consideration of the total composition of the Conference. It
was decided to adopt certain criteria to decide which countries could
be invited "to participate effectively and in the spirit of wholehearted
cooperation." Some delegates wanted to guard against invitations to
countries "which were 'non-aligned' in name only." Also it was agreed,
in some cases, to make informal approaches to prospective invitees,
so embarrassment would be avoided both to the countries invited and
to the sponsors if the invitations were rejected. Finally, five criteria
were adopted as the basis of issuing invitations to states to attend the
Conference:
"1. The country should have adopted an independent policy based
on the co-existence of States with different political and social systems
and on non-alignment or should be showing a trend in favor of such
a policy.
"2. The country concerned should be consistently supporting the
movements for national independence.
"3. The country should not be a member of a multilateral military
alliance concluded in the context of great power conflicts.
"4. If a country has a bilateral military agreement with a great
power, or is a member of a regional defense pact, the agreement or

pact should not be one deliberately concluded in the context of great
power conflicts.
"5. If it has conceded military bases to a foreign power, the
concession should not have been made in the context of great power
conflicts."
The practical application of these criteria raised additional questions. It was finally agreed to form a continuing credentials committee
consisting of countries present which had diplomatic representation in
Cairo. This committee was charged with securing additional acceptances
using the approved criteria.
At the preparatory meeting the agenda of the Conference was
also discussed. The following draft agenda was adopted:

"I. Exchange of views on the international situation.
"11. Establishment and strengthening of international peace and
security.
1. Respect for the rights of peoples and nations to selfdetermination, struggle against imperialism, liquidation of
colonialism and neo-colonialism.
2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
States; noninterference and nonintervention in internal affairs
of States.
3. Racial discrimination and apartheid.
4. General and complete disarmament; banning of nuclear
tests; problem of foreign military bases.
5. Peaceful co-existence among States with different political
and social systems.
6. Role and structure of the U.N. and the implementation of
its resolutions.

"111. Problem of unequal economic development; promotion of
international economic and technical cooperation.

"IV. Any other matters.

"V. Communique of the Conference."
Three nations-Yugoslavia, Cuba, and the U.A.R.---offered to be
hosts to the Conference. It was voted to hold the Conference in Yugoslavia beginning on September 1, 1961. The host country was given the
task of administering the Conference. The official languages were to be
Arabic, English, French, and Spanish. The expenses of the Conference
were to be shared in an equitable manner.
Between the end of the preparatory meetings on June 12th and
the opening of the Conference on September lst, the committee of

ambassadors in Cairo made a number of inquiries in an effort to enlarge
the number of states to be present. Some of the initial sponsors wanted
a wider range of states represented. Togo, Uppee Volta, and Nigeria
publicly turned down invitations and it was reported that other states
(e.g., Mexico) did so privately. Additional states which were not present
at the Cairo preparatory meetings but which did attend the Conference
included the Congo (Premier Adoula as well as Vice-Premier Gizenga) ,
Cyprus, Lebanon, Somalia, Tunisia, and Yemen. In addition to Brazil,
Bolivia and Ecuador agreed to send observers.
By the end of July, two meetings were held in Belgrade to reach
agreement on administrative procedures. On August 27-28, a commirtee on organization met also in Belgrade. Draft rules ofprocedure for
the Conference were adopted. Yugoslavia agreed to meet all Conference
expenses incurred, except those for translation and transcription. U.N.
and U.A.R. personnel were hired for simultaneous translation. These
expenses were shared by all states represented except Algeria, with
India paying 25 per cent and several of the smaller states paying only
1.21 per cent each. Leo Mates, Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs of
Yugoslavia, was named secretary of the Conference.

THE OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE

"In the present extremely tense international situation,
this Conference is the most competent forum, outside the
United Nations, where the representatives of non-aligned
countries can state, as simply and as strongly as possible,
their views regarding . . . promoting world peace and constructive cooperation among peoples."
-President Josip Broz Tito
The Conference opened on September first with 24 srates represented by heads of state or government or by ranking diplomats. Before
its conclusion, the premier and vice-premier of the Congo (Leopoldville)
also appeared. A list of the heads of state present is given in Table 1.
Each head of state was accompanied by a delegation of diplomats. It
was estimated that these delegations totalled more than 500 persons.
The well-known personalities present who were not heads of state
included V. K. Krishna Menon and B. K. Nehru of India, Ali Sastroamidjojo of Indonesia (chairman of the Bandung Conference), and
U Thant of Burma.
In addition, Yugoslavia accredited official observers from nongovernmental organizations. These included Holden Roberto of the

TABLE 1.
The Heads of State or Government and Chiefs of
Delegations Present at the Belgrade Conference

Prime Minister Sardar Mohammad
Daud Khan.

AFGHANISTAN:

ALGERIA (PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT) :

Prime Minister Ben Youssef Ben Khedda.
BURMA: Prime Minister U Nu.
CAMBODIA: Prince Norodom Sihanouk ( head of

.

state)
CEYLON: Prime Minister (Mrs.) Sirimavo R. Bandaranaike.
CONW (LEOPOLDVILLE) : Premier Cyrille Adoula.
CUBA: President Osvaldo Dorticos (Torrado) .
CYPRUS: President (Archbishop) Makarios.
ETHIOPIA: Emperor Haile Selassie I.
GHANA: President Kwame Bh.unah.
GUINEA: Luis Lansana Beavogui
(Minister of Foreign Affairs) .
INDIA: Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.
INDONESIA: President Ahmed Sukarno.
IRAQ: Hashim Jawad (Minister of Foreign Affairs).
LEBANON: Prime Minister Saeb Salam.
MALI: President Modibo Keita.
MOROCCO: King Hassan II.
NEPAL: King Maharajadhiraja Bir Bikrarn.
SAUDI ARABIA: Sheikh Ibrahim Sowayel
(Minister of Foreign Affairs).
SOMALIA: President Aban Abdullah Osman
SUDAN: President Ibrahim Abboud.
TUNISIA: President Habib Bourguiba.
u.A.R.: President Gamal Abdel Nasser.
YEMEN: Prince Seyful Islam El Hassan
(Permanent Representative to the U.N.).
YUGOSLAVIA: President Josip Broz Tito.
BOLIVIA : Jose Tellman Valorde
(Minister of Education).
BRAZIL: Afranio de Melo Franco
(Ambassador to Switzerland).
ECUADOR: Dr. Jose Joaquim Silva
(Ambassador to West Germany).

Union of the Peoples of Angola, Oliver R. Tambo of the South African
United Front, Sam Njoma of the South West Africa People's Organization, Michael Scott of the Africa Bureau (London), and Homer A.
Jack of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (New York) .
A huge press corps converged os Belgrade for the Conference.
They totalled more than 1,000 reporters, photographers, and writers.
There were 121 journalists from the United States, only outnumbered
by the Yugoslavian press ( 140 persons). Other large press contingents
included West Germany ( 59), UX. (45), U.A.R. (44), France and
Italy (38 each), and India (20). The US.S.R. sent nine reporters and
China was represented by seven.
Most of the plenary sessions of the Conference were held in the
Federal Parliament Building in downtown Belgrade, built in Italian
Renaissance style and flanked by two huge sculptured horses. The pink
and yellow marble chamber was fitted with a huge circular table and
with a seat for each head of state. There were chairs for five members
of each delegation behind the head of state. On the main floor were
also seats for distinguished guests from Yugoslavia and the Conference
stenographers and space for television cameras. In the balcony were
separate sections for the diplomatic corps accredited to Belgrade, the
press, and official nongovernmental observers. There was simultaneous
translation into English, Arabic, and French by means of individual
transistor radios. Two of the plenary sessions were closed and held in
the Federal Executive Council Building in New Belgrade.
The several hundred persons allowed in the balcony and the thousands of Yugoslavs watching the full coverage of the plenary sessions
on television saw interesting sights. Archbishop Makarios planted a kiss
on the cheek of President Nasser. The latter and President Bourguiba
slapped each other on the shoulder. President Nkrumah tried to amuse
Emperor Haile Selassie.
National costumes predominated. Sheikh Sowayel and his colleagues
from Saudi Arabia wore the black bisht, white k&yeh, and gold agal
of Bedouin tradition. Foreign Minister Beavogui of Guinea wore a
flowing striped robe with a red skullcap embroidered in gold. The
ladies from Guinea wore rainbow-hued organdie gowns and headscarves.
Archbishop Makarios wore the black robes and high-crowned hat of
a Greek Orthodox prelate. Prince Seyful of Yemen had a white turban
while Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia wore a white duck jacket. V. K
Krishna Menon sported his cane and Jawaharlal Nehru wore the Gandhi
cap and a rosebud in his tunic. President Sukarno was dressed in a white
double-breasted suit, rows of military ribbons, and a black caracul hat.
Many heads of state wore traditional, subdued Western clothes, such
as President Tito, Emperor Haile Selassie, President Nasser, and
President Nkrumah.

There were several informal receptions and dinners during the
Conference. At the largest in the Metropole Hotel, Marshal Tito played
host ro the heads of state, and other special guests, while several thousand persons watched this "family party" for which protocol was disregarded. Along with caviar and lobster, there was whisky from Britain,
vermouth from Italy, vodka from the Soviet Union, and plum brandy
(slivovitz) from Yugoslavia. A 12-piece band played jazz while the
guests drank and ate.
The city of Belgrade was tidied for the "konferencija." Buildings
were whitewashed, fluorescent street lights emplaced, and fountains and
flower-arrangements constructed. Uniformed militiamen were brought
to Belgrade from the provinces.
The heads of state were quartered in private villas, although some
preferred to live in the big hotels. The press had its working headquarters in a large trade union center on Marx and Engels Square.

THE PLENARY iSESSlONS
'

I

,.

.

"Belgrade, which has throughout its long history seen
'matiy wars of conquest, invasions and invaders
. now
for the first time has the opportunity to welcome in its
midst. the highest representatives of 27 countries-champions of peace."-President losip Broz Tito

..

.

The principal .business of the Conference was transacted during 17
plenary sessions. An outline of each session follows.
SEPTEMBER FIRST

FI@T PLENARY SESSION. President Tito opened the Conference at
10:ob'a.m. with a minute of silence honoring all those who lost their
lives in the struggle for freedom and independence. He then made a
speech of welcome. The agenda of the first session was adopted. The
presence of 24 delegations and two observers was aflirmed. The Conference'agenda and rules of procedure were adopted as well as a report
on'financial and organizational matters. President Sukarno initiated the
general debate.
SECOND PLENARY SESSION. General Abboud was chairman. President Nasser spoke. The session adjourned at 1:00 p.m.
*
THIRD PLENARY SESSION. President Bourguiba was chairman.
Conference secretary Leo Mates read messages from King Ibn Saud of
Saudi Arabia, President Sekou Tourk of Guinea, President Victor Paz

Estenssoro of Bolivia, and Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic
of China. He also announced that greetings had been received from a
number of non-governmental organizations and nationalist movements.
Speeches were given by General Abboud and President U Nu.
FOURTH PLENARY SESSION. President Nasser was chairman.
Speeches were delivered by President Bourguiba and Prime Minister
Daud.
SEPTEMBER SECOND

FIFTH PLENARY SESSION. Prince El Hassan was chairman. Emperor
Haile Selassie I and President Nkrumah participated in the general
debate. President Nasser proposed that a drafting committee be appointed. After some discussion, it was decided to continue the general
debate and to form a drafting committee to which every delegation
would appoint one representative. The first meeting of the committee
was held in the afternoon.

SIXTH PLENARY SESSION, Prime Minister Daud was chairman.
Secretary Mates read messages from Premier A. K. Kassem of Iraq,
President Kennedy, and Premier Khrushchev. Speeches were given by
Prime Minister Nehru ( the only extemporaneous address) and President Dorticos.
SEVENTH PLENARY SESSION. Prime Minister Ben Khedda was
chairman. The Secretary read a message from the President of the Royal
Council of Cambodia. Prime Minister Saeb Salam and Foreign Minister
Sheikh Sowslyel spoke.
EIGHTH PLENARY SESSION. Prime Minister U Nu was chairman
of this evening session which began at 6:40 p.m. King Mahendra Bir
Bikram and Dr. Hashim Jawad spoke in the general debate.
SEPTEMBER THIRD

NINTH PLENARY SESSION. President Dorticos was chairman.
Speakers included President Tito and Archbishop Makarios.
TENTH PLENARY SESSION. Archbishop Makarios was chairman,
with Prime Minister Bandaranaike and Prince Sihanouk as speakers.
ELEVENTH PLENARY SESSION. Emperor Haile Selassie I was chairman. Speeches were made by King Hassan 11, President Modibo Keita,
and Jose Tellman Valorde ( of Bolivia) .
SEPTEMBER FOURTH

TWELFTH PLENARY SESSION. President Nkrumah was chairman.
Foreign Minister Beavogui and President Osman spoke in the general
debate.

THIRTEENTH PLENARY SESSION. Foreign Minister Beavogui was
chairman and addresses were made by Prime Minister Ben Khedda and
Prince Hassan,

FOURTEENTH PLENARY SESSION. This was a closed meeting. It
was attended only by the leader of each delegation accompanied by one
adviser. The session opened at 4: 50 p.m. and closed at 8: 30 p.m.
SEPTEMBER FIFTH

FIFTEENTH PLENARY SESSION. Premier Salam was chairman.
Prince Sihanouk announced that his government decided to recognize
de jure the Provisional Government of Algeria. President Khedda
welcomed this action and asked other countries to follow Cambodia's
example. Presidents Tito and Nknunah announced that their governments would grant de jure recognition to the Provisional Government
of Algeria. Speeches were made by Premier Adoula and Vice-Premier
Gizenga. A minute of silence was observed in tribute to Patrice
Lumumba of the Congo.

SIXTEENTH PLENARY SESSION. This was a closed meeting, again
attended only by the heads of delegations and one other member from
each delegation. The text of documents drawn up by the drafting
committee was discussed, amended, and approved. The session ended at
1:15 am.
SEPTEMBER SIXTH

SBVBNTEBNTH PLENARY SESSION. King Hassan I1 chaired this
closing session which began at 2:00 a.m. A representative of Brazil
took his seat as an observer. James Barington of Burma read the final
Conference documents. King Hassan I1 gave the closing address. The
Conference adjourned before 3:00 a.m.

WHAT IS NON-ALIGNMENT?

"The non-aligned countries represented at this Conference
do not wish to form a new bloc and cannot be a bloc. They
sincerely desire to co-operate with any Government which
seeks to contribute to the strengthening of confidence and
peace in the world. . . . They consider that the further
extension of the noncommitted area of the world constitutes the only possible and indispensable alternative to the
policy of total division of the world into blocs, and intensification of cold war policies."-Belgrade DecEatatwn

The Belgrade Conference was ocganized by non-aligned states to
project the non-aligned judgment of world problems on the world
stage. If the preparatory conference in Cairo had difficulty in creating a
definition of non-alignment (see p. 5 ) , the heads of state in the general
debate added several facets to the world's understanding of their own
concept of non-alignment.
In a real sense Prime Minister Nehru has been the architect of
the concept of non-alignment. He and his country faced misunderstanding and criticism for a decade because of this position. Mr. Nehru
was able at Belgrade to observe: "It is a strange thing that some few
years ago-six, seven, or eight, if you like-this business of non-alignment was a rare phenomenon. A few countries here and there talked
about it and other countries rather made fun of it, or at any rate did
not take it seriously. 'Non-alignment? What is this? You must be on
this side or that side.' That was the argument. Well, that argument is
dead today; nobody dare say that, because the whole course of history
of the last few years has shown the growing opinion, the spread of this
conception of non-alignment." If more countries have now accepted
this concept, most still differ somewhat on its essence. And much of the
aligned world is still unclear about its meaning.
The non-aligned nations at Belgrade agreed that they are not
neutral. Thus President Makarios declared: "Our neutrality is not
conceived in the sense of remaining indifferent and passive to world
problems." President Nkrumah criticized "negative neutralism" and
those states which avoid "taking a definite stand on issues which affect
the balance of power in the world today." He added that "negative
neutralism is no shield at all; and in my view negative neutralism is a
completely impracticable policy, and even dangerous." President
Sukarno also said that "non-alignment is not neutrality; it is not the
sanctimonious attitude of the man who holds himself aloof-'a plague
on both your houses."' There was, however, one kind of neutrality
which some of the heads of state in Belgrade endorsed-neutrality in
the power struggle between the two blocs and thus in the cold war.
Emperor Haile Selassie declared: "We mean, in sum, that we are all,
in the ultimate sense, neutral in the cold war which rages unabated
in the world today." With this frequent exception, the heads of state
do not like to be called "neutrals" or "noncomrnitted."
Objectivity and independence were two concepts used repeatedly
by the non-aligned. These statesmen felt that, because of their noninvolvment, they could approach world problems with more objectivity
and independence than nations wedded to one bloc or the other. King
Hassan I1 spoke of their choices being ' b i d e d by constant objectivity."
Foreign Minister Sowayel suggested that "non-alignment means that
our souls must be innocent of any bias towards any bloc in a dispute.

Freed of any bias, our feelings can examine problems freely." Archbishop
Makarios also talked of non-alignment as being "the source of our
freedom of judgment and independent approach to world problems."
There is only a short distance from this concept of objectivity to
one of morality. The non-aligned states are not a military force or an
economic force, but their leaders often call them a moral force. Thus
Archbishop Makarios labelled the Conference a "world moral force."
Emperor Haile Selassie talked of their serving as "the collective conscience of the world." President Nknunah used the designation, "moral
force." So did President Sukarno in calling the Conference a "co-ordinated accumulated moral force." President Osman hoped that they
would always "act in accordance with the moral dictates of our conscience." President Bourguiba likened the group to a "moral 'striking
force' which, if well directed, will sooner or later overcome another
well-known 'striking force.' " President Nasser hoped that they would
be "the power of conscience in this world."
The non-aligned states have some common commitments, but they
were not explicitly designated at Belgrade. One can, however, generalize
in suggesting that the commitments of the "noncommitted include
initially peaceful co-existence and then peace and not war, independence
and not colonialism, equality and not racism, economic development
and not continued poverty, and support for the U.N. No such systematic platform was constructed at Belgrade.
The dangers of non-alignment were not ignored at the Conference.
The chief one expressed was the fear that the nations assembled would
form their own bloc. President Makarios said that it was "not the
purpose of this Conference to create a third bloc." This would "involve
limitations on objectivity." President Sukarno declared that "we abhor
the very idea of blocs." President Tito asserted that "fears that this
meeting might mark the beginning of the formation of a third bloc
are groundless." However, several heads of state hoped that there would
be more co-ordination amongst the 25 states than before. For example,
Prime Minister Bandaranaike said: "We must not allow our spirit of
unity and purpose which has been so evident at this Conference to
disintegrate and fall apart. . . . W e cannot, in my view, rely on the
haphazard form of consultation which we have employed in the past.. ..
We must adapt our procedures to meet that challenge. I would, therefore,
suggest that some method should be devised by this Conference to
enable our individual countries to ascertain the maximum area of
agreement among ourselves, without the need of a formal Conference
of Heads of State." But Prince Sihanouk warned that "the solidarity so
essential to the non-aligned nations must not be permitted to develop
into a rigidly exclusive bloc spirit." Because of this fear, the Conference
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adjourned without announcing the establishment of any machinery
even for the limited objectives suggested by Mrs. Bandaranaike.
Some of the additional dangers of non-alignment were not mentioned by the heads of state. The objectivity of some nations is qualified
by their commitments. Also it is qualified by the stature of their leaders,
all of whom ate affected-as all human beings-by matters of power
and prestige. Prince Sihanouk admitted that it has been suggested that
the non-aligned countries try to establish their influence "by shamelessly
exploiting the rivalry between the two nuclear blocs." He denied that
he and his fellow statesmen would do so, but some of this exploitation
is probably inevitable.
The objectivity of the non-aligned is also tempered by strategy.
Some heads of state evidently feel that plain-speaking often heightens
tensions, not lessens them, and thus again both objectivity and morality
are qualified. For example, Prince Sihanouk observed that while "certain
Powers have committed and are still committing reprehensible acts,
acts which we denounce," he felt that "to denounce these Powers by
name, to insult them and threaten them has never-according to our
humble e x p e r i e n c d o n e anything but make them more stubborn and
entrench them still more deeply in their evil ways, for it is for them a
question of humiliated pride."
A final danger of non-alignment was suggested by Prime Minister
Nehru. He told his fellow delegates that they could not issue mandates:
"We must not overestimate our own importance. After all, we do not
control the strings of the world, not only in the military sense but in
other senses also. W e must realize both our actual and our potential
strength that we have, and also the lack
of strength that we have."
*
Most of these realities of non-alignment were discussed in one form
or another in the general debate.

NUCLEAR TESTS-"

DOUBLE STANDARD?

"The participants in the Conference consider it essential
that an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear and
thermo-nuclear tests should be urgently concluded. With
this aim in view, it is necessary that negotiations be immediately resumed, separately or as part of the negotiations
on general disarmament. Meanwhile, the moratorium on
the testing of all nuclear weapons should be resumed and
observed by all countries."-BeIgrade Declaration
When the Belgrade Conference was first conceived in the spring

of 1961, US.-U.S.S.R. tensions were high. By the time the heads of
state were preparing to attend the Conference, and writing their
speeches for the general debate, the Berlin and German situation made
tensions even more acute and World War I11 a possibility. Then on the
very eve of the Conference, Premier Khrushchev publicly revealed that
the Soviet Union would resume nuclear weapons tests. The announcement by President Kennedy that the U.S. would resume underground
tests did not reach Belgrade until the final hours of the Conference.
Premier Khrushchev's announcement shocked the heads of state
and their delegations as it did much of the non-Communist world. Some
heard of the Soviet move while enroute to Belgrade. For example,
Indian reporters asked Prime Minister Nehru for his reaction to the
Soviet announcement as soon as he landed at the Belgrade airport. He
replied that he did not have the full details, but added: "I am against
nuclear tests by any power."
Although the resumption of Soviet tests heightened world tensions
and constituted an added reason to hold the Belgrade Conference,
Premier Khrushchev's act did not change the Conference itself. In the
general debate, about two-thirds of the heads of state referred to the
resumption of Soviet tests (see Table 2 ) . Some wove this reference into
their speeches in an extemporaneous manner, while a few perhaps did
not refer to it at all because their speeches had been composed and
printed weeks before. There was no move in the general debate to send
an urgent resolution to Mr. Khrushchev to stop his testing program.
Indeed, there is evidence that discussion in the drafting committee of
the paragraph on nuclear tests was very brief. It appears that there was
so much controversy on other issues-to emphasize world peace or
colonialism, to send delegations to Moscow and Washington, to word
the Berlin-Germany statement judiciously, and to set a deadline on the
ending of colonialism-that scant time was given in committee to the
wording of the statement on nuclear tests. What is hard to believe is
that none of the foreign ministers on the drafting committee and none
of the heads of state in the penultimate plenary session realized that
the wrath of the Western world would be directed to the Conference
if it did not make some judgment, however mild, on the resumption
of nuclear tests by the U.S.S.R.Such a judgment was lacking and all the
Declaration did was to ask that a moratorium be resumed and observed
by all countries.
A second deficiency of the Belgrade Declaration relating to tests
was its refusal to make a judgment on the substance of the test-ban
negotiations in Geneva. The West had reason to hope that the Belgrade
Conference would evaluate the Geneva talks and at least acknowledge
that the West was bargaining in good faith and that the world could
not countenance a troika control of any test-ban administration. Instead,
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TABLE 2.
Excerpts from Speeches of Heads of State Pertaining to
the Resumption of Nuclear Weapons Tests by the U.S.S.R.
PRIME MINISTER BEN KHEDDA OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF ALGERIA: "We must, of course, fight for the dis-

continuance of nuclear explosions.

. . ."

PRIME MINISTER B ~ A R A N A I K B OF CEYLON: "Unfortunately, disarmament negotiations, regarding both nuclear tests
and general disarmament, have come to a standstill, and, what is
worse, nuclear tests have been resumed by the Soviet Union."

PREMIER CYRILLE ADOULA OF THE CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE) :

The resumption of nuclear tests "defies the legitimate hopes of
mankind. . . . The nuclear race is in fact genocide."
PRESIDENT DORTICOS OF CUBA: "The problem of the cessation of thermo-nuclear tests is subordinated to the general problem of disarmament and the elimination of situations of conflict
which constitute a peril of war. A total agreement on disarmament would, at the same time, bring about the cessation of
such tests."
ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS OF CYPRUS: "We were shocked to
hear that the Soviet Union had declared its intention to resume
nuclear tests and still more shocked to hear yesterday that it had
already started such tests. In this connection I would also wish
to place on record our concern over the carrying out of nuclear
tests by France in Africa, against world opinion and in disregard
of the protests of the people of that continent."
PRESIDENT NKRUMAH OF GHANA: "Only last night, the
Soviet Union exploded a nuclear device. This was a shock to me,
as it must have been to you all. But it is a shock which forcibly
brings home to us the supreme danger facing mankind."

FOREIGN MINISTER BEAVOGUI OF GUINEA: "We should
propose that the Conference should . . . decide that we shall support efforts to reach agreement on general and controlled disarmament and to stop all nuclear blasts immediately."
PRIME MINISTER NEHRU OF INDIA: "This danger of war
comes nearer and nearer, has been enhanced and has become
nearer to us, perhaps, by the recent decision of the Soviet Govern-

ment to start nuclear tests. Now I am not in a position, and I
suppose no one else here is in a position, to know all the facts
which underlie these decision+all the military considerations,
political, non-political considerations, whatever they may be-but
one thing I know: that this decision makes the situation much
more dangerous. That is obvious to me; therefore I regret it
deeply because it may well lead to other countries also starting
this and then, apart from the danger inherent in nuclear teststhat is radioactive substances falling and all that-all this brings
us to the very verge and precipice of war. That is why I deeply
regret it, and because of all this it has become even more urgent
that this process of negotiation should begin without any delay,
without thinking of who is going to ask whom first. The person
who asks first will deserve the credit, not the person who shrinks
from asking others."
FORBIGN MINISTER JAWAD OF IRAQ: "It is therefore extremely essential, in the scheme of total disarmament, to abolish
the production and use of all nuclear weapons; prohibit once for
all any kind of atomic tests, and to place these matters under an
effective system of international control."
PRESIDENT SALAM OF LEBANON: "We are truly astonished,
as was the whole world, by the Soviet Union's resumption of
nuclear weapons tests on an unimaginable scale. Our pain was
increased by the fact that the declaration of this intention was
issued on the very eve of our meeting here where we plan to
urge all the powers to listen to the dictates of reason, and avoid
for humanity a war of annihilation. This announcement should
however increase our faith in the soundness of our objective."

KING HASSAN I1 OF MOROCCO: "A limited agreement on
discontinuing nuclear tets could at least have removed the danger
of any increase in the number of countries in possession of atomic
weapons. The three-power conference, however, that has been
meeting for this purpose for more than two years has still not
completed its work at Geneva. Morocco, a victim of the continuation of nuclear tests, took decisive action in the U.N. which
resulted in the adoption by the latter of a resolution condemning
the French explosions in the Sahara; there has, alas, been no
attempt to implement this resolution. Unfortunately, the news of
the resumption of nuclear tests by the U.S.S.R.has caused us
serious concern, coming as it does at a time when the whole

world and we at this Conference were awaiting the conclusion
of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests as a preliminary and decisive stage in progress towards general and
complete disarmament."
KING MAHARAJADHIRA JA OF NEPAL: "The course of negotiations on the ban of the nuclear tests has been equally tenuous,
though more progress has been made in this field than in the
other field (general disarmament). We believe the Conference
must make it clear that the non-aligned countries are unitedly
in favor of complete banning of nuclear tests."
FOREIGN MINISTER SOWAYEL OF SAUDI ARABIA: ''The removal of the causes of fear and terror which lie behind the
armaments race and nuclear tests must be one of the most important aims of this meeting; the parties concerned must be
persuaded of the essential need to disarm and halt nuclear tests."
PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA OF TUNISIA: "IS it not a fact that
what restrains the atomic powereFrance excepted-from new
nuclear tests is world public opinion and the will to peace of the
people? At the present time it is more than ever necessary for
us to assert the determination of our peoples to oppose a united
front to nuclear tests or the threat of the resumption of such
experiments whatever may be the source of these tests or of such
a threat. It is in this spirit that we express our opinion of the
unexpected decision recently announced by a Great Power. This
decision is liable to heighten international tension and increase
the anxiety of the peoples."
PRESIDENT NASSER OF THE U.A.R.: "Another cause for deep
regret is the fact that in this atmosphere filled with anxiety, the
Government of the Soviet Union found itself in a position
which, according to its own paint of view, leads it to the resumption of nuclear tests. This decision shodred me just as it
shocked world public opinion. Yet, whatever the motives of the
Soviet Government that prompted this decision, the main thing
in it is its clear bearing on the deterioration of the dangerous
international situation. It is painful that the armament race is
not confined to the U.S. and the Soviet Union alone, but we
actually found other countries such as France which persist in
provoking world public opinion by holding nuclear tests in the
homeland of peoples who refuse to allow their land to be the
field of such experiments."

PRESIDENT TIT0 OF YUGOSLAVIA: "The negotiations on the
discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests have also reached an
impasse. What is even worst, a Western power which is a member
of the Atlantic Pact-France-has
failed to comply with the
resolutions of the U.N. on the discontinuance of atomic tests,
but continues to carry out such tests, while the other Western
powers possessing atomic armaments have not taken any resolute
measures against this. The matters have now reached a point
where the Soviet Government has published a statement on the
resumption of nuclear weapons tests. W e are not surprised so
much by the communique on the resumption of atomic and
hydrogen weapons tests, because we could understand the reasons
adduced by the Government of the U.S.S.R. W e are surprised
more by the fact that this was done on the day of the opening
of this Conference of peace. All this has alarmed the world to
an even greater extent."

the Conference merely asked for an immediate resumption of negotiations, either separately (as the West wanted) or as part of general
disarmament negotiations (as the Soviet Union desired).
It has generally, but not uniformly, been concluded that the nonaligned states displayed a double standard by their handling of the
test-ban issue at Belgrade. Had the West resumed nuclear tests first,
the Belgrade Conference would have been much more outspoken. While
some of the non-aligned states have made a habit of deflating the moral
pretensions of the West, this double standard has called into serious
question the objectivity and moral force of the non-aligned states
themselves.
Numerous conclusions have appeared to explain this double
standard. Following are some of the more common explanations.

The non-aligned states are pro-Souiet. There is little evidence to
substantiate this claim. One or two of the 24 independent states represented at Belgrade may have voted in recent months with the Soviet
bloc at the U.N., but all 24 states have generally had an independent
foreign policy.
The non-digned states are impre,rsed by the Souiet potential. Others
may feel that Communism is the ideology of the future, especially since

the recent Russian conquests of space. They do not want to cut themselves off from what they feel may be the ultimate winner in the current
ideological struggle.
The non-aligned states me i~imidatedby Soviet miliitmy power.
Some are contiguous neighbors of the Soviet Union or the People's
Republic of China and they feel that they cannot afford to oppose
blatantly a powerful neighbor. Some smaller states fear Soviet atomic
and rocket power. They fall victims of Soviet atomic blackmail. Terrorized, they see no alternative to war other than to urge the West
to accommodate to Russian demands.
The nun-aligned states hate the Wes#. The legacy of colonialism
and racism is so deep that some Asian and African states are unable to
side with the West even on an issue in which the Soviet Union is
wrong. The memories of recent European colonialism-from which the
U.S. has not completely disengaged itself-remain vivid. Thus these
states cannot bring themselves to denounce the Soviet Union since, by
that act, they would be placing themselves on the side of their erstwhile
colonial masters in the cold war.
The non-aligned states expect far more from the West. The attitude
of many of the non-aligned states toward the West is not one of simple
hate, but consists of an ambivalent quality. Such leaders as Prime
Minister Nehru and President Nkrumah have been schooled in the
West and in many ways they are more Western than Asian or African.
When the West does wrong, they are critical because they expect more
from the West. When the Soviet Union does wrong, they are not surprised, because they expect less. This expectation of better political
behavior from the West, despite the West's long period of colonial and
racist misbehavior, may be a compliment to the West, but it does not
weigh on the pragmatic scales of the cold war.
The nun-aligwd state5 know how to influence Wester# p ~ b l i c
opinion. In trying to modify the actions of the nuclear powers, the nonaligned states have to use different approaches. There is public opinion
in the West. Public criticisms can, in time, affect Western public opinion
which in turn can change Western policy. The non-aligned states feel
that there is not the same kind of public opinion affecting policy under
Communism. If they want to bring about changes in Soviet policy, they
must act in a dzerent manner, probably through diplomatic channels.
The non-aligned states think jhey understud the power struggle
within the Soviet Union. Some of the states present at Belgrade insisted
that public criticism of Mr. Khrushchev would not help stop nuclear
tests, but only make Mr. Khrushchev's position within the Soviet
hierarchy more difficult. They felt that if Mr. Khrushchev were to be

overthrown, his replacement would be far worse in terms of peaceful
coexistence. Thus for these strategic reasons they tried to prevent any
sharp criticism of Mr. Khmhchev during the Conference (coming as it
did only a few weeks before the 22nd congress of the Soviet Communist
par9 5
, The son-aligned Itates havs t k i r own priorities of interest. To
most of the inhabitants of the non-aligned world, the cold war is of
little or no concern. Berlin and Germany are distant-geographically
and psychologically. Their people have more immediate political and
economic problems. For example, Mr. Nehru in a television program
with Mr. Adlai Stevenson on November 12, 1961, attributed the lack
of strong protests against Soviet tests to the fact that rhe newer nations
of Africa are not personally involved. He suggested that the African
nations are militant if there are tests in Africa, but tests in the Soviet
Union are a long way away. Then Mr. Nehru added: "But the thing is
the same, whether it is in Africa, Europe, or somewhere else." The fact
remains that most of the non-aligned states are not as concerned about
the line which divides the West from the Communist world as they
are aboui that which divides the developed from the nondeveloped
world.

The non-aligned states are neatrat in the cold war for economic
reasons. The ex-colonies are not by coincidence the present underdeveloped countries. By treading carefully, despite the cold war, and
refusing ideological commitments, they have managed to begin the long
process of economic and industrial development with billions of dollars
and rubles of economic aid. In order not to jeopardize the continuance
of this help from both ideological camps, they pay the political price
of trying to maintain the status quo by maintaining an equidistance
between the two blocs. Being more neutral than non-aligned, some of
these nations may praise one bloc, or another, but they never criticize
either to the point that they become aligned and thus would be cut off
from economic aid from the other side.
The non-digned states want to end the cold war, not help win it.
They feel that they must talk softly to all nations, disagreeing with
policies, but not attacking the great powers for purely propagandistic
motives. If they spoke too critically, they would not-in the words of
President T i t h t t b r i n g about a relaxation of tension in the world, but
would, on the contrary, add to the tension." This is a denial that they
do possess a double standard. The non-aligned nations insist, however
belatedly, that they would not have reacted dserently had the U.S. first
resumed nuclear testing. They would also have disagreed with a US.
resumption of explosions, but they insist that they would not have done
so in a way which would have made the international climate worse.

WAR AND DISARMAMENT

"War has never threatened mankind with graver consequences than today. On the other hand, never before has
mankind had at its disposal stronger forces for eliminating
war as an insuument of policy in international relations."
-Belgrade Declaration
Prime Minister Nehru asserted that "nothing is more important
or has more priority than this world situation of war and peace." His
priority for the Belgrade Conference was adopted by the drafting
committee and the heads of state. Quite independently most statesmen
present automatically emphasized the worsening international situation.
Mrs. Bandaranaike said rhat she attended the Conference "as a woman
and a mother who can understand the thoughts and feelings of those
millions of women, the mothers of the world, who are deeply concerned
with the preservation of the human race." For this utterance, she received
one of the rare applauses during the plenary sessions. She also stated
that there is not a single mother "who could bear to contemplate the
possible danger to her children of being exposed to atomic radiation
and slow and lingering death, if not swift annihilation." She warned
the statesmen of the world that they do not "have a mandate to precipitate a nuclear war and immense destructive power either to defend a
way of life or to extend a political ideology." Prime Minister U Nu
felt that the cold war had taken a "sharp turn for the worse." There
was a "palpable drift toward open conflict." Man today lives "his entire
life in a fear-laden atmosphere," with a "nagging fear that every day
may be the last for him and his family." Archbishop Makarios reflected
that mankind is living "in the agony of what might happen tomorrow
in the shadow of the dread of possible destruction under the menace of
a new war." Because the means of total destruction have now been
placed in the hands of man, "humanity will have to abolish war or
perish." Prime Minister Nkrumah likewise warned that if war ever
comes, "the missiles and rockets cannot be prevented from reaching us
at our non-aligned doors."
In addition to denouncing war, the heads of state tried to find
means of eliminating it. They discussed the necessity of negotiation and
of disarmament, quite apart from the special issues of nuclear weapons
tests and of the role of foreign military bases. The principle of peaceful
coexistence was also reaffirmed.
The general impasse between the West and the Soviet Union, and
the particular stalemate over Berlin, were discussed from many viewpoints. The necessity of negotiation was repeatedly underlined. President
Nasser admitted that the Kennedy-Khrushchev talks in Vienna "did not
achieve the objectives hoped for." Yet he added that "negotiations are

essential and if they do not succeed we must try anew.*' He called
negotiations the "only safe way in such a clouded atmosphere." And
the heads of state in their Appeal for Peace urged the President of the
U.S. and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to
"make most immediate and direct approaches to each other to avert the
imminent conflict and establish peace."
The Conference also urged continued U.S.-U.S.S.R. negotiations
"until both they and the rest of the world achieve total disarmament
and enduring peace." The discussions about disarmament at Belgrade
were more sophisticated than at previous Asian-African conferences,
partly because the non-aligned states are devoting more attention to
disarmament problems and partly because there has been more discussion
of this issue recently on the world stage. Many disarmament ideas were
aired. Prince Sihanouk suggested that disarmament control should "not
be entrusted to the two great powers," but to a neutral commission
composed of the non-aligned countries. President Nkrumah also said
the inspection teams should be composed exclusively of non-aligned
states since "it would eliminate all suspicion, create confidence in the
inspection method, and help solve this crucial and vital issue." He urged
that representatives from the non-aligned world be represented at all
future disarmament conferences. President Tito called for a "new
approach" to disarmament, one which involved the "broad and active
participation of countries which have neither been involved in the arms
race nor directly engaged in disarmament negotiations." He felt the time
had come to convene a general world disarmament conference in an
d o r t to take the disarmament problem "off dead center." He also advocated initial and partial measures, but not as a substitute to complete
disarmament which remained "the basic and increasingly urgent task."
Mrs. Bandaranaike reminded the heads of state that she and the heads
of Cyprus, Ghana, and India discussed disarmament at length at the
Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in March 1961 and she
commended their communique on disarmament.
One aspect of current Western military posture drew widespread
criticism: foreign military bases. Prime Minister Daud called them
"a threat to the peace of the world," especially those which "have been
farced on the soil of people against their wishes." Prince Sihanouk
declared that no country has the right to maintain a military base in a
nation "in the face bf opposition from its legitimate Government."
President Dorticos urged the dismantling and abolition of foreign bases,
and said the U.S. base in Guantanamo was used "to wound our national
dignity, to harbor counter-revolutionary forces, and to introduce arms
inrb the country for use against the liberating forces of the Revolution."
A key to the foreign policies of many of the countries represented
ar Belgrade &as the cohcept of peaceful coexistence. Prime Minister
a

U Nu said: "We believe that man must learn to coexist, regardless of
his differences, and that he must not be deterred or discouraged because
of differences, because differences will exist as long as man lasts."
Prince Sihanouk defined co-existence as "simply a renunciation of the
use of force to impose an ideology." Coexistence should create a climate
of confidence, relaxed tension, and friendship among all nations. The
Belgrade Conference reflected this concern. It suggested that diflerent
social systems do not constitute an "insurmountable obstacle for the
stabilization of peace, provided attempts at domination and interference
in the international development of other peoples and nations are ruled
out." The Declaration pointedly asserted that "any attempt at imposing
upon peoples one social or political system or another by force and from
outside is a direct threat to world peace." This principle of co-existence
is the "only alternative" to the continuance of the cold war and
ultimately a nuclear catastrophe.

BERLIN AND GERMANY
"The countries participating in the Conference consider
that the German problem is not merely a regional problem
but liable to exercise a decisive influence on the course of
future developments in international relations. Concerned
at the develo~mentswhich have led to the bresent acute
aggravation Gf the situation in regard to Germany and
Berlin, the participating countries call upon all parties
concerned not to resort to or threaten the use of force to
solve the German question or the problem of Berlin, in
accordance with the appeal made by the Heads of State or
Governments on 5 September, 1961."
-Belgrade Decla~ation
The Conference convened when the Berlin crisis was severe and
thus many heads of state understandably emphasized Berlin and Germany
in their speeches in the general debate. Some made general observations,
while others presented specific solutions. Prime Minister U Nu, for
example, deplored the military response of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
to the Berlin crisis, as if "the facts of nuclear warfare have not yet
sunk in deep enough." What "shocked" him was that "the responses and
counterresponses have been undisguisedly military in character." The
willingness of the Great Powers to go to war if necessary over Berlin
"represents a bankruptcy of common sense and reason." He asserted
that "there is no problem in this world, however intractable, which
cannot be solved by negotiations and without loss of honor to either
side."

Prime Minister Daud of Afghanistan urged that it was the duty

of the non-aligned states to prevent war over Berlin by taking the
initiative in bringing about negotiations. Several heads of state, including
Emperor Haile Selassie and President Salam, suggested that the issue
be taken directly to the U.N. Prime Minister Nehru spoke of the "two
independent entities, powers, countries" of East and West Germany as
"a fact of life." He added: "It is not a matter of my or anyone else's
liking or disliking it; it is a fact that has to be recognized." President
Sukarno declared: "Common sense demands the recognition of the
temporary de fact0 sovereignty of two Germanies as a big reality."
Several heads of state mentioned the reality of the Oder-Neisse line.
Thus President Nkrumah. observed: "The Oder-Neisse Frontier which
emerged from the last war should be respected."
Access to West Berlin was discussed. Emperor Haile Selassie supported-the concept of "free access to West Berlin." President Nkrumah,
in Belgrade after an extensive visit to the Soviet Union and China,
asserted that access to West Berlin "has been guaranteed over and
over again by those who have authority to give such a guarantee." Prime
Minister Nehru was "glad that Mr. Khmshchev himself indicated that
such access "will not be limited." He felt that "if that is made perfectly
clear and guaranteed by all concerned . . . one of the major fears and
major causes of conflict will be removed." President Sukarno observed
that "the people of West Berlin should have free access to the other
part of the world and the people of the world should also have free
access to West Berlin."
Other solutions to the German problem were also proposed.
Several speakers talked of the reunification of Germany. Thus Prince
Sihanouk urged reunification "on the express condition that it remain
neutral." Also the concept of self-determination was suggested. Archbishop Makarios said: "Any solution of the problem of Germany should
not disregard the will of the German people whose right to determine
freely their status and future cannot be denied." He felt that "any
negotiations for the solution of the Berlin crisis and of the German
problem in general must be based on the will of the German people
freely expressed." He suggested that the "Germans themselves decide
through a plebiscite under the auspices of the U.N. their form and
system of government and as to whether Germany should be united or
remain divided." President Sukarno urged that "the Germans themselves
decide their future destiny." And President Salam declared that a
permanent solution to the Berlin situation can be found if the German
people are permitted to exercise their fundamental right to selfdetermination."
President Dorticos advocated "the immediate signature of a peace
treaty which would confirm the frontiers of Germany as they were

established at Potsdam." President Tito urged negotiations toward "at
least a provisional solution, which would not prejudge a final settlement
to be achieved later."
With the specter of nuclear war over Berlin hanging above the
Conference, and the advocacy of many different solutions, the drafting
committee faced a difficult decision. Should it merely ask the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R. to negotiate or should it suggest the lines of negotiation?
A number of members of the Committee urged that a strong paragraph
be put into the Declaration, at least acknowledging the existence of the
two German states and the necessity of not changing the Oder-Neisse
line. The Indian delegation, however, felt that specific recommendations
from the Conference would not aid negotiations. Prime Minister Nehru
in the general debate warned: "We may have our ideas, and when the
time comes we may even say so, but our indicating 'these are the lines
for your settlement, for negotiation,' instead of helping may hinder,
because we are dealing with proud nations and they may react wrongly."
He added: "Therefore, we cannot really lay down any terms on which
they should negotiate; but it is our duty and function to say that they
must negotiate, and any party that does not do so does tremendous
injury to the human race." In maintaining this position, the Indians in
the drafting committee not only had the support of the Southeast Asians
(except the Indonesians), but they also had the vote of the Arab states,
including the U.A.R. The rather mild statement in the Declaration on
Berlin and Germany had this origin and reportedly was adopted in the
drafting committee by a vote of 15 to 9.

COLONIALISM AND NEO-COLONIALISM

"In so far as any historical perspective is concerned, the
era of classic colonialism is gone and is dead, though of
course it survives and gives a lot of trouble yet; but essentially it is over."-Prime Misister Nehrre
During his speech in the general debate, Prime Minister Nehru
turned the Belgrade Conference from a traditional gathering of the
ex-colonial nations into one perhaps primarily devoted to reducing world
tensions. In the preparatory meetings, the Indians and others made the
point that there was no need to convene a meeting of busy heads of
state just to discuss regional issues, such as Goa, West Irian, or Guantanamo. These problems would be inevitably solved, perhaps at the
United Nations. Yet most heads of state nevertheless came to Belgrade
eager to discuss and document their favorite colonial theme. Thus Prime
Minister Nehru astounded his peers by suggesting that "there is a time

and a place to press any subject and today the time and the place and
the occasion are here to take up this question of war and peace." He
acknowledged that they all "stand for anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism,
anti-racialism, and all that." He added that these goals "may be very
important but they are secondary." While Mr. Nehru won his battle
for a separate statement on Big Power negotiations, the twin evils of
colonialism and racism were heatedly debated. And a new evil was
added-neo-colonialism.
If the traditional emphasis on anti-colonialism was softened by the
decision that it did not have top priority of importance, anti-imperialism
in its many forms still took high priority in debate, especially in the
drafting committee. There were two contentious issues: whether or not
a date should be set for the ending of colonialism and whether or
not Israel should be castigated as a colonial center of imperialism in
West Asia.
The President of Cuba in the general debate was among those who
urged that the Conference set a date for the "end of colonialism, within
a fired period." President Nkrumah proposed that "by 31st December,
1962, all Colonial powers should withdraw from Africa." President
Sukarno demanded "that a time limit be imposed for the complete
removal of all forms of colonial subjugation of one nation by the other."
He felt that "in the case of every remaining colonial regime, that time
limit must not exceed two years, and must, if possible, be less than
that." President Tito also called for 'precisely defined target dates" for
the implementation of the U.N. anti-colonial resolution. After much
debate, this recommendation was approved by a narrow vote in the
drafting committee. In the penultimate plenary session, however, the
heads of state deleted the date. Prime Minister Nehru, Prime Minister
U Nu, and others felt that a uniform date would be impracticable.
They did, however, support the U.N. resolution granting independence
to colonial countries and recommended "the immediate, unconditional,
total, and final abolition of colonialism . . . in all its forms and manifestations."
There was a similar debate in the drafting committee on a paragraph about Israel. Some of the heads of state wanted a strong indictment of Israel in the Declaration. Prime Minister U Nu was chiefly
responsible for softening the initial statement by threatening to object
t o the final Declaration. While several heads of state sharply criticized
Israel in the general debate, the Declaration blandly condemned "the
imperialist policies pursued in the Middle East, and declare their support
for the full restoration of all the rights of the Arab people of Palestine
i n conformity with the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations."
The continuing war in Algeria was high in the thoughts of all
#delegates,especially since Prime Minister Ben Khedda of Algeria was

present. He was accompanied by many of his diplomatic associates and
found the Conference a fertile environment for political achievement.
The Prime Minister of Afghanistan in his speech in the general debate
announced "our official recognition" of the Provisional Government of
Algeria. At the 15th plenary session, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia
revealed that his government would grant de jure recognition to the
Provisional Government of Algeria. This stimulated both President Tito
and President Nkrurnah also to announce de jure recognition.
The action of the French at Bizerte was, next to Algeria, in the
minds of all present, and this led to a general discussion of what has
been called neo-colonialism. The Prime Minister of Afghanistan explained that "although colonialism is being forced to withdraw, it still
seeks through intrigue and deception to retain its self-interest in other
forms and shapes." Prince Sihanouk referred to "certain countries which
have never lost their independence" but are "in fact under severe
economic subjection and consequently are not at liberty to pursue their
political life in accordance with their own wishes and interests." He
urged that they be liberated with "fraternal assistance" from the nonaligned states since they "belong in fact to o w non-committed world."
Emperor Haile Selassie observed that "colonialism, defined in the classic
sense, is forever finished, both in Africa and in Asia," but he urged
his fellow heads of state to "recognize and deal with the attempts being
made from all quarters to perpetrate colonial exploitation under new
forms and to introduce into our continents new systems no less inimical
to freedom and liberty." President Dorticos stated "new methods for
exploitation of peoples are being developed by means of the economic,
political, and military penetration of neo-colonialism." He talked of
"client's sovereignty" and "a pretended economic aid which cripples
national development and lays down political conditions." These are
"odious forms of that neo-colonialism which today throws a threatening
shadow over the Afro-Asian countries."
Undoubtedly the problem of neo-colonialism was discussed more
at Belgrade than at similar conferences and this discussion is reflected
in the Declaration. Of the several sections devoted to this topic, one
key paragraph asserts: "All nations have the right of unity, selfdetermination, and independence by virtue of which right they can
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social,
and cultural development without intimidation or hindrance."
The savage repression of Angolans by Portugal was discussed by
most heads of state. Roberto Holden, head of the Union of the Peoples
of Angola, listened in the gallery. The Declaration contained a special
paragraph on Angola, urging "a free and independent state without
delay."
Apartheid was denounced, but without the adoption of any concrete

proposals for its elimination. However, there was determination that
a new kind of racism should not develop elsewhere. Prime Minister
U Nu hoped the non-aligned states would "resist any temptation to
brand all the white races as evil merely because their particular rulers
happen to be white." If they did, they would make "a tragic division
of the world on the basis of color." He urged that, in combating evil,
they "need to have both a large heart and a level head." Prince Sihanouk
likewise urged that they eradicate from their mind "all traces of that
racialism of which we are not guiltless." He hoped the Conference would
issue a resolution "solemnly proclaiming the right of ethnic or religious
minorities to treatment on an equal footing with the people among
which they live." He asked that they "take care not to let past humiliations develop today into an anti-white racialism which would be as
deplorable as the anti-black or anti-yellow racialism of the past."
The relationship of the U.S. to Cuba elicited comment in the general
debate and in the drafting committee. The President of Cuba drew a
long indictment of the "imperialist conduct of the U.S. Government
towards the struggle for national liberation of the Cuban people." He
also urged that the "colonialist domination in Puerto Rico be condemned."
Not many heads of state referred to the Cuba situation, although
President Tito said the "best illustration of how deeply ingrained are
the aspirations of the people to liberate themselves from all elements of
colonial and semi-colonial dependence is provided by the recent attempt
at aggressive intervention in Cuba, where the whole people unanimously
rose in arms to oppose it." President Dorticos was able to include two
references to Cuba in the final Declaration.

THE UNITED NATIONS

"The participating countries consider it essential that the
General Assembly of the U.N. should, through the revision
of the Charter, find a solution to the question of expanding
the membership of the Security Council and of the Economic and Social Council in order to bring the composition and work of these two most important organs of
the General Assembly into harmon with the needs of the
Organization and with the expan ed membership of the
U.N. The unity of the World Organization and the assuring of the efficiency of its work make it absolutely necessary to evolve a more appropriate structure for the Secretariat of the U.N., bearing in mind equitable regional
distribution. Those of the countries participating in the
Conference who recognize the Government of the People's
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Republic of China recommend that the General Assembly
in its forthcoming Session should accept the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China
as the only legitimate representativis of t h 2 country in the
U.N."-Belgrade DecIrwation
The heads of state in their speeches in the general debate supported
the U.N., generally denounced the Russian proposal for a troika, and
made moderate suggestions for strengthening the U.N. and giving it
greater effectiveness. President Bourguiba called the U.N. "in spite of
its imperfections . . . the great hope of mankind . . the instrument
without which the law of the jungle would prevail." President Tito
suggested that "the weakening of the U.N. would have an extremely
negative effect upon the general development of international relations."
Several speakers reflected the special value of the U.N. to the
smaller countries. Prime Minister U Nu said: "We believe that this
need (for the U.N.) is greater for the smaller, weaker countries than
for the big, powerful ones." He added that it would be "a black day
indeed for the world, and particularly for the smaller countries, if the
U.N. were to sufFer the fate of the League of Nations." Emperor Haile
Selassie of Ethiopia, whose history was so bound up with the League,
poignantly spoke of the "supreme importance which we, and particularly
the smaller nations among us, must continue to attach to the role
played by the U.N. in the field of international relations." He also said
that "it is not the great powers that need or benefit from the existence
of the U.N.; it is the small powers, which depend on and require and
demand that it live." He added knowingly: "It is we who have the most
to lose should it one day be relegated to a tidy niche in history, a niche
already occupied by the League of Nations."
Several statesmen condemned those states which bypassed the U.N.
Thus President Tito suggested that it is "essential to wage a resolute
fight against all tendencies to bypass and weaken the Organization and
to distort its role." The Prime Minister of the Provisional Government
of Algeria discussed "the attitude of contempt towards the U.N. shown
by certain States-France in particular--an attitude adopted with an
assurance of impunity." He felt it resulted in the diminution of the
UN.'s prestige and authority. Prime Minister U Nu expressed "concern
at the attitude adopted towards the U.N. by some of the Great Powers,
since it goes without saying that the U.N. would be no U.N. without
the participation of the Great Powers." Emperor Haile Selassie recalled
how "the great powers, while prepared to use the U.N. when it suits
their convenience, have been equally willing to ignore and bypass it and
act independently of it when their interest so dictated."
The proposals for enhancing the U.N. were both general and
specific. Archbishop Makarios urged that the U.N. be "helped in its
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evolution towards becoming an effective instrument of governments for
peace based on world law." The King of Nepal hoped that the U.N.
would ''grow in such a manner as would inspire the coddence of
(small) nations." The President of Somalia asserted that the U.N.
"deserves our full support" and he paid tribute "to the colossal and
marvellous results achieved by the U.N. in the Congo under the most
dif5cult conditions imaginable." The King of Morocco called for charter
review: the convening "of a general conference of all states members
of the organization with a view to undertaking a full and comprehensive
revision of the Charter."
There were repeated suggestions that the People's Republic of
China be allowed to take her place in the U.N.Prime Minister U Nu
said that "this refusal to accept one of the major political facts of life
of today's world has been a serious source of weakness to the U.N. as
a world organization." Prime Minister Bandaranaike hoped that "wise
counsels will prevail and China will take her legitimate seat in the
U.N." President Dorticos said the China problem at the U.N. "does not
admit of spurious temporary solutions, such as the proposal that the
lawful government of China should be represented in the U.N. side by
side with that of Formosa." Emperor Haile Selassie complained of
hundreds of millions of Chinese unrepresented at the UN. President
Nkrumah spoke of the "anomaly of China's exclusion."
Many heads of state discussed Russia's proposals for changing the
character of the secretariat. Only the President of Cuba supported the
Soviet suggestion. He said: "We must acknowledge that the Secretariat
should no longer remain under the control of a single individual, whose
assumed neutrality-as has been shown by events in the Congo and by
the murder of Lumumba--does not offer any guarantee that the Organization's executive powers will be properly used." President Nkrumah
felt the present organization of the Secretariat "outmoded," especially
because of the tragic experiences in the Congo. He proposed a troika
of deputies and also an executive body elected by the General Assembly
"to ensure that the decisions of both the General Assembly and the
Security Council would be faithfully and promptly implemented by
the Secretariat." President Sukarno said the structure "requires reorganization."
Other heads of state upheld the concept of a single executive and
some specifically criticized Russia's intrusion of the troika. Prime
Minister U Nu spoke of being "disturbed by the attitude adopted by
the Soviet Union towards the U.N.because she finds herself in disagreement with some decisions taken by the world organization." He felt
the troika would "seriously impair the value and effectiveness of the
organization." He hoped the Soviet Union "would not press this matter."
Prime Minister Bandaranaike specifically criticized the troika and the

triumvirate of deputies, saying: "We feel that the Secretary-General
should retain sole executive authority for carrying out the directives of
the General Assembly, and Security Council, and the other bodies of
the UN." The King of Nepal called the troika "clearly unworkable."
The President of Somalia felt there are "no grounds for altering the
structure" of the U.N. without destroying its effectiveness. He called for
every effort "to resist any deviation from the principle of an independent
International Civil Service." President Bourguiba favored "a strong
Secretary-General invested with powers of interpretation and enforcement." President Tito suggested that a certain revision of the Secretariat
might be helpful, but 'hot in a way which would amount to a freezing
of present divisions in the world."
It remained for Premier Cyrille Adoula of the Congo to say the
last informed word on this topic: "In regard to the problem of the
U.N. Secretary and the proposals that he should be replaced by a threemember committee, we hold that the Congolese experience provides an
important argument against such proposals. Really, the power of veto,
used by any member of such a triumvirate, would undermine every
practical decision and would reduce the executive functions of the
Organization to ineffectiveness without precedent."

AN EVALUATION

"The Conference may be proud of the fact that it has not
fulfilled the expectations of the bad prophets."
-King Hassan 1?
Any evaluation of the Belgrade Conference must include an
enumeration of both its achievements and its disappointments. While
a preliminary weighing of these against each other can be done today,
the ultimate evaluation can only be made by history.
ACHIEVEMENTS

The principal achievement of the Belgrade Conference was its
effort to induce President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev to help
turn the world away from war and toward negotiations. Prime Minister
Nehru was influential in urging the heads of state at Belgrade to give
highest priority to peace-making, saying the world situation was "by far
the most dangerous that has arisen in the last 15 years or so since the
last war ended." Thus there were repeated discussions on war and peace
in the general debate and extensive considerations in the drafting com-

mittee and in the closed plenary sessions on the best approach to the
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The Conference discussed and approved an
Appeal for Peace. The day after the Conference formally adjourned,
a committee of eight heads of state composed identical letters to President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev. These letters were followed by
discussions with Mr. Khrushchev in Moscow by Prime Minister Nehru
and President Nkrumah and with Mr. Kennedy in Washington by
President Sukarno and President Keita. While it is hard to evaluate the
results of these activities, both President Kennedy and Premier
Khrushchev felt it important to respond in full to these visits and
communications. (See d e m e n t s in Appendix).
A second achievement of Belgrade was to identify and enhance
the non-aligned position in the world. The Bandung p r i n c i p l ~ o n t i nental afliliation-has become increasingly unsatisfactory, although the
Asian-African caucussing group formed after the Bandung Conference
has had a significant influence at the U.N. Yet the 29 Bandung nations
covered too broad a political spectrum (e.g., People's Republic of China
to Turkey). At the same time the Bandung formula was geographically
limiting, with Europe and even Latin America excluded. Under the
Belgrade formula, non-alignment is a position if not a force which is
potentially universal. It is no longer bound by continent and color,
with the admittance of Cyprus, Yugoslavia, and Cuba into the group.
While the aligned states in Asia, such as the Philippines, Thailand, and
Turkey have been excluded, it is expected that additional states will
gravitate to the Belgrade "no bloc." Inevitably some states will leave
as their policies in the U.N. and elsewhere become more aligned either
toward the Soviet Union or the West.
The third achievement of Belgrade was to underline the multiple
and continuing concerns of the 25 nations for a variety of common goals.
They demanded that the U.N.continue, not in a weaker form, but
stronger. They underlined the importance of disarmament. They showed
the need for economic development. And they emphasized the huge
areas of remaining colonialism as well as the dangers of neo-colonialism.
The Conference held high these issues and asked for their continued
priority on the world's agenda, including that of the U.N.
DISAPPOINTMENTS

If there were achievements at Belgrade, there were also disappointments. The chief one was, of course, the double standard displayed
especially on the issue of the resumption of nuclear weapons tests but
also on Communist colonialism. A discussion of the Belgrade reaction
to the nuclear test issue is discussed at length elsewhere (p. 15).
That the Conference did not discuss Communist penetration of Tibet

and the continued Communist occupation of the Eastern European
countries, such as Hungary, are indications that most of the nations
present at Belgrade still refuse to recognize that colonialism and imperialism can derive from other than Western and capitalistic sources.
A second disappointment was the refusal of the Conference
Declaration to deal with the Berlin and German problem except to call
upon all parties not to use or threaten force. While a judgment on
Berlin or Germany from basically a Communist viewpoint would have
been disastrous and embarrassing for the Conference, a judgment of at
least the minimum facts about Berlin and Germany would have been
valuable. Such a statement by the Conference early in September 1961
would have been a timely contribution to world discussion when there
was so much unreality about the Berlin and German problem. By not
saying anything more about Berlin than what appeared in the Declaration, the heads of state lost an important opportunity to give prudent
leadership to help solve a crucial problem.
A third disappointment was the absence at Belgrade of some states
which were expected to attend. The Bandung Conference consisted of
27 independent nations. Certainly after the birth of so many African
states since 1955, one would expect many more than the 24 independent
nations which appeared at Belgrade, even if some of the original
Bandung nations could not be invited because of their political alignments. The absence of otherwise eligible states was due in some cases
to unfortunate decisions by the preparatory meetings in Cairo and
in others to belated invitations which some of the heads of state invited
felt they had to reject under the circumstances. The absence of some
states was due to their own wish not to be aligned even with the nonaligned! It is expected that many additional states will attend any
second conference. Yet at Belgrade such important non-aligned states
as Nigeria, Togo, and Tanganyika (the latter nearer to independence in
September 1961 than Algeria) were conspicuously and unfortunately
absent.
A final disappointment lay in the problems evidenced in even the
non-aligned states themselves. Below the unity there was considerable
disunity. There tended to be continuing commitments among the "noncommitted" to the right (Cyprus, Nepal) and to the left (Cuba,
Yugoslavia). A polarization developed on several occasions between
the Casablanca group (Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, U.A.R.
and the Provisional Government of Algeria) and the Southeast Asia
group (India, Burma, and Ceylon, but not Indonesia). In addition,
there were the usual personality conflicts and power struggles. Regional
disagreements also intruded, such as the border dispute between Ethiopia
and Somalia. Despite these disappointing divisions, the unity was still
impressive, especially at a first meeting of the group.

WHO WON AT BELGRADE?

"We look forward to continued friendly relations with
the Government and peoples participating in the Belgrade
meeting."-Pre~ident Kemdy, Sept. 13, 1961
"It is gratifying that the views of the Soviet Government
on the obtaining world situation coincide in 'many respects with the considerations set forth in the letter from
the Conference participants."
-Premier Khr~cshcheu,Sept. 16, 1961
Although the Belgrade Conference was confined to non-aligned
states, the two great power blocs watched the Conference closely. And
the question has frequently been asked, who won at Belgrade?
There was widespread initial disappointment with the Belgrade
Conference in official and nongovernmental circles in the West. Many
considered the Conference a stunning "defeat" for the U.S. Yet
originally official US. policy toward the Belgrade Conference was
opposite of that toward the Bandung Conference. In 1955, Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles tried to persuade America's allies in Asia
(e.g., the Philippines and Turkey) not to accept an invitation to attend
the Bandung Conference. He was unsuccessful, but he persuaded President Eisenhower not to send a message of greetings to Bandung. During
the intervening six years, U.S. policy changed and Mr. Dulles' dictum
that neutrality is immoral was abandoned, both in the closing months
of the Eisenhower Administration and in the early period of the
Kennedy Administration.
If the Kemedy Administration did not exactly welcome the Belgrade Conference, it certainly "prepared for it. American ambassadors
to nations attending the Conference were asked to brief the foreign
officers on the status of the Geneva test-ban negotiations. President
Kennedy even sent Ambassador Arthur Dean back to Geneva (after an
absence-of two months) with new proposals in an dfon to show the
Belgrade Conference that the US. was seriously perming the test-ban
negotiations. While at least two U.S. ambassadors urged nations invited
to Belgrade not to attend, their actions were officially repudiated by the
State Department. The official policy was one of hope, if not enthusiasm,
toward the Conference.
Despite conflicting advice from his ambassadors to non-aligned
states, President Kennedy announced at a press conference that he was
cabling the following greeting to the Conference: "It is always
encouraging when responsible world leaders join together to consider the problems that beset mankind. We recognize that most of
the countries at Belgrade do not consider themselves committed on

certain issues which confront us today, but we do know that they are
committed to the U.N. Charter. The people of the U.S. share this
commitment. W e know that those gathering in Belgrade are committed
to finding a way to halt the waste of the earth's resources in the building
of the implements of death and destruction, and the people of the U.S.
have constantly pledged themselves to this goal. W e believe that the
peoples represented at this conference are committed to a world society
in which men have the right and the freedom to determine their own
destiny, a world in which one people is not enslaved by the other, in
which the powerful do not devour the weak. The American people
share that commitment, and we have pledged the influence of this
nation to the abolition of exploitation in all of its forms. The peoples
represented at Belgrade are committed to achieving a world at peace in
which nations have the freedom to choose their own political and
economic systems and to live their own way of life, and since our
earliest beginnings this nation has shared that commitment. All this and
much more the leaders at Belgrade have in common. This and much
more the people of the U.S. have in common with them. So for myself
and I'm sure for the American people I express the hope that their
deliberations there will bring us all nearer these goals."
American hopes for signs of approval by the Belgrade Conference
of some of its official policies were heightened by the announcement
of the resumption of nuclear tests by Russia. Just what the Kennedy
Administration expected the heads of state at Belgrade individually or
collectively to do in response to the Russian announcement is unclear.
Probably it was hoped that the delegates at Belgrade would pause from
their deliberations and issue a rhetorical blast at the Russians equal to
the nuclear blast of the Russians. Instead, the Conference continued its
work as scheduled, despite the great uneasiness caused by the Russian
announcement. Many heads of state modified their prepared addresses
to refer to the Russian announcement and the Conference Declaration
contained a modest paragraph on nuclear tests. There was, however, no
reprimand to the Soviet Union. The mild reaction to the Russian tests
immediately prevented most Americans from perceiving any other
accomplishments of the Conference. This reflex set in motion a train
of second-thoughts about Belgrade, non-alignment, and the U.S. position
toward the countries represented at Belgrade.
While the Conference was still in session, President Kennedy had
occasion to sign the foreign aid bill and he expressly appended this
sentence: "It is my belief that in the administration of these funds we
should give great attention and consideration to those nations who
have our view of the world." Also there were reports from Washington
that continued U.S.economic and agricultural aid to Yugoslavia and
economic aid to the Volta River project in Ghana were being recon-

sidered because of the deportment of the presidents of these two states
at the Belgrade Conference. It has also been suggested that the President
resumed American nuclear tests in reaction to the Belgrade Conference.
Had the resumption of Soviet tests been criticized, the US. Government would have been more sensitive to non-aligned opinion.
Just how anti-American (or anti-West) was the Belgrade Conference? The President of Cuba made some sharp statements during the
general debate on the relationship of the U.S. to Cuba (and Puerto
Rico) and on America's lack of hospitality to non-white delegates at
the U.N. On his insistence, the Belgrade Declaration contained a
paragraph on the U.S. military base at Guantanamo. Otherwise, there
was nothing explicitly anti-American at the Conference. The Declaration
did endorse policies-such as the seating of the People's Republic of
China in the U.N.-which had long been opposed by the U.S. and
favored by the U.S.S.R. But such action by the Conference cannot be
considered anti-American any more than the attacks on some of
America's closest NATO allies-France and Portugal-for their colonial
and neo-colonial activities in Africa.
If disenchantment with Belgrade developed in the U.S., there
curiously developed enchantment in the U.S.S.R. In 1955 the Soviet
Union welcomed the convening of the Bandung Conference and has
since tried to make use of the Bandung mistique. For one thing, the
U.S.S.R. had hoped for the convening of a second Bandung Conference
which would not only include the People's Republic of China, but
probably herself, since she is partly an Asian power. The Slgrade
formula of non-alignment resulted in the exclusion of both China and
the Soviet Union. Also the Russians were probably annoyed that
Yugoslavia should have been selected as host for the Conference. Thus
the Soviet press did not reflect any enthusiasm for Belgrade in the
weeks before the Conference was held. It dispatched only nine reporters
to Belgrade (the Chinese sent seven), but Chairman Khrushchev did
cable an official message to the heads of state quite apart from his
nuclear blast heralding its opening. He said in part: "Pursuing the lofty
humanistic aims of ensuring peace and eliminating the remnants of
the past war, the peace-loving states cannot but take measures to put
out the remaining sources of war danger and curb the forces of aggression and revenge.''
Somewhere in the midst of the Conference, the Soviet Union
suddenly found that the meeting was not going as badly as she had
feared. As the US. lost interest, the U.S.S.R. gained interest. But just
how pro-Soviet was the Belgrade Conference? N o head of state made
any sharp statements against Soviet policy, but no head of state
endorsed many of Russia's current political ideas either. No head of
state directly praised Russia for resuming nuclear tests. Nobody endorsed

her troika proposal, either for the U.N. or for the test-ban control
body. While some heads of state advocated a deadline for the end of
Western colonialism-as Russia had advocated-the Conference itself
voted down any date. Again, while several heads of state tended to
reflect the Russian position on Germany, and many advocated a compromise position on Germany, the Conference itself took no substantive
position on Germany and only pleaded for big power negotiations.
The Conference did urge the admission of the People's Republic of
China and changes in the United Nations, and it did make massive
attacks on colonialism and neo-colonialism, but these are certainly not
"Soviet" issues. The Soviet Union made negative gains at the Belgrade
Conference: the Russian resumption of tests was not officially condemned; neither was Communist colonialism in Hungary or Tibet.
Thus the Belgrade Conference was only pro-Soviet in the sense that
the Soviets tried belatedly to make it so and, in the attempt, they
received the psychological help of many Americans.
With the passage of time, the U.S. is having second thoughts
about its initial reaction to the Belgrade Conference. Already both
power blocs are trying to use the Belgrade mistique for their own
ends. President Kennedy, speaking to the U.N. less than three weeks
after the Conference ended, discussed the risks inherent in disarmament
and said that they pale in comparison with the risks inherent in an
unlimited arms race. Then he observed: "It is in this spirit that the
recent Belgrade Conference-recognizing that this is no longer a Soviet
problem or an American problem, but a human problem-endorsed a
program of general, complete and strictly internationally controlled
disarmament." One day later, on September 26, 1961, Soviet Foreign
Minister Andrei Gromyko, also speaking during the general debate
of the 16th General Assembly, asserted that the wider international
recognition given to the two German states, the stronger will be the
foundations of peace in Europe. He then gave a nod to Belgrade when
he added: "Many participants in the recent Belgrade Conference of
non-aligned countries were quite justified in pointing out that the need
for this is long since ripe." Mr. Gromyko also found it useful to appeal
to the Belgrade powers, even if he had to echo several individual
speeches and not the official Belgrade Declaration.
Who won at Belgrade? The verdict of history may be that no bloc
triumphed overwhelmingly, not even the non-aligned states themselves.

DOCUMENT 1. Danger of War and Appeal for Peace.

This Conference of the Heads of State or Government of NonAligned Countries is deeply concerned that, even apart from already
existing tensions, the grave and critical situation which, as never before,
threatens the world with the imminent and ominous prospect of conflict,
would almost certainly later develop into a World War. In this age of
nuclear weapons and the accumulation of the power of mass destruction,
such conflict and war would inevitably lead to devastation on a scale
hitherto unknown, if not to world annihilation.
This Conference considers that this calamity must be avoided, and
it is therefore urgent and imperative that the parties concerned, and
more particularly the United States of America and the U.S.S.R.,
should immediately suspend their recent war preparations and approaches, take no steps that would aggravate or contribute to further
deteriorations in the situation, and resume negotiation for a peaceful
settlement of any outstanding differences between them with due regard
to the principles of the United Nations Charter and continue negotiating
until both they and the rest of the world achieve total disarmament and
enduring peace.
While decisions leading to war or peace at present rest with these
great powers, the consequences affect the entire world. All nations and
peoples have, therefore, an abiding concern and interest that the
approaches and actions of the great powers should be such as to enable
mankind to move forward to peace and prosperity and not to the doom
of extinction. In the certain knowledge that they seek peace, this
Conference appeals to the President of the United States of America
and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to make
most immediate and direct approaches to each other to avert the
imminent conflict and establish peace.
This Conference expresses the earnest hope that all nations not
represented here, conscious of the extreme gravity of the situation
will make a similar appeal to the leaders of the Powers concerned
thereby proclaiming and promoting the desire and determination of
all mankind to see the achievement of lasting peace and security for
all nations.
DOCUMENT 2. Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of
Non-Aligned Countries. (The Belgrade Declaration.)

The Conference of Heads of State or Government of the following
non-aligned countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon,
Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq,
Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia,
United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia and of the following coun-

tries represented by observers: Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador was held in
Belgrade from September 1 to 6, 1361, for the purpose of exchanging
views on international problems with a view to contributing more
effectively to world peace and security and peaceful co-operation among
peoples.
The Heads of State or Government of the aforementioned countries
have met at a moment when international events have taken a nun
for the worse and when world peace is seriously threatened. Deeply
concerned for the future of peace, voicing the aspirations of the vast
majority of people of the world, aware that, in our time, no people and
no government can or should abandon its responsibilities in regard to
the safeguarding of world peace, the participating countries-having
examined in detail, in an atmosphere of equality, sincerity and mutual
confidence, the current state of international relations and trends prevailing in the present-day world-make the following declaration:
The Heads of State or G o u e ~ m l t tof Non-Aligned Cozcnt~ies,
noting that there are crises that lead towards a world conflict in the
transition from an old order based on domination to a new order based
on cooperation between nations, founded on freedom, equality and
social justice for the promotion of prosperity; consideri~gthat the
dynamic processes and forms of social change often result in or represent
a conflict between the old established and the new emerging nationalist
forces; con~ideringthat a lasting peace can be achieved only if this
confrontation leads to a world where the domination of colonialismimperialism and neo-colonialism in all their manifestations is radically
eliminated; and recognizing the fact that acute emergencies threatening
world peace now exist in this period of conflict in Africa, Asia, Europe
and Latin America and big power rivalry likely to result in world conflagration cannot be excluded; that to eradicate basically the source of
conflict is to eradicate colonialism in all its manifestations and to accept
and practice a policy of peaceful coexistence in the world; that guided
by these principles, the period of transition and conflict can lay a firm
foundation of co-operation and brotherhood between nations; stute ths
following:

War has never threatened mankind with graver consequences than
today. On the other hand, never before has mankind had at its disposal
stronger forces for eliminating war as an instrument of policy in international relations.
Imperialism is weakening. Colonial empires and other forms of
foreign oppression of peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America are
gradually disappearing from the stage of history. Great successes have

been achieved in the struggle of many peoples for national independence
and equality. In the same way, the peoples of Latin America are continuing to make an increasingly effective conuibution to the improvement of international relations. Great social changes in the world are
further promoting such a development. All this not only accelerates the
end of the epoch of foreign oppression of peoples, but also makes
peaceful co-operation among peoples, based on the principles of independence and equal rights, an essential condition for their freedom and
progress.
Tremendous progress has been achieved in the development of
science, techniques and in the. means of economic development.
Prompted by such developments in the world, the vast majority of
people are becoming increasingly conscious of the fact that war between
peoples constitutes not only an anachronism but also a crime against
humanity. This awareness of peoples is becoming a great moral force,
capable of exercising a vital influence on the development of international relations.
Relying on this and on the will of their peoples, the Governments
of countries participating in the Conference resolutely reject the view
that war, including the "cold war," is inevitable, as this view reflects a
sense both of helplessness and hopelessness and is contrary to the
progress of the world. They &m their unwavering faith that the
international community is able to organize its life without resorting
to means which actually belong to a past epoch of human history.
However, the existing military blocs, which are growing into more
and more powerful military, economic and political groupings by the
logic and nature of their mutual relations, necessarily provoke periodical
aggravations of international relations.
The cold war and the constant and acute danger of its being
transformed into actual war have become a part of the situation prevailing in international relations.
For all these reasons, the Heads of State and Representatives of
Government of non-aligned countries wish, in this way, to draw the
attention of the world community to the existing situation and to the
necessity that all peoples should exert efforts to find a sure road towards
the stabilization of peace.

The present-day world is characterized by the existence of different
social systems. The participating countries do not consider that these
differences constitute an insurmountable obstacle for the stabilization
of peace, provided attempts at domination and interference in the
internal development of other peoples and nations are ruled out.

All peoples and nations have to solve the problems of their own
political, economic, social and cultural systems in accordance with their
own conditions, needs and potentialities.
Furthermore, any attempt at imposing upon peoples one social or
political system or another by force and from outside is a direct threat
to world peace.
The participating countries consider that under such conditions the
principles of peaceful coexistence are the only alternative to the "cold
war" and to a possible general nuclear catasuophe. Therefore, these
principles-which include the right of peoples to self-determination,
to independence and to the free determination of the forms and methods
of economic, social and cultural development-must be the only basis
of all international relations.
Active international cooperation in the fields of material and
cultural exchanges among peoples is an essential means for the strengthening of confidence in the possibility of peaceful coexistence among
States with different social systems.
The participants in the Conference emphasize, in this connection,
that the policy of coexistence amounts to an active effort towards the
elimination of historical injustices and the liquidation of national
oppression, guaranteeing, at the same time, to every people their
independent development.
Aware that ideological differences are necessarily a part of the
growth of the human society, the participating countries consider that
peoples and Governments shall refrain from any use of ideologies for
the purpose of waging cold war, exercising pressure, or imposing their
will.

The Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries
participating in the Conference are not making concrete proposals for
the solution of d international disputes, and particularly disputes
between the two blocs. They wish, above all, to draw attention to those
acute problems of our time which must be solved rapidly, so that they
should not lead to irreparable consequences.
In this respect, they particularly emphasize the need for a great
sense of responsibility and realism when undertaking the solution of
various problems resulting from differences in social systems.
The non-aligned countries represented at this Conference do not
wish to form a new bloc and cannot be a bloc. They sincerely desire to
co-operate with any Government which seeks to contribute to the
strengthening of confidence and peace in the world.
The non-aligned countries wish to proceed in this manner all the

more so as they are aware that peace and stability in the world depend,
to a considerable extent, on the mutual relations of the Great Powers.
Aware of this, the participants in the Conference consider it a
matter of principle that the Great Powers take more determined action
for the solving of various problems by means of negotiations, displaying
at the same time the necessary constructive approach and readiness for
reaching solutions which will be mutually acceptable and useful for
world peace.
The participants in the Conference consider that, under present
conditions, the existence and the activities of non-aligned countries in
the interests of peace are one of the more important factors for safeguarding world peace.
The participants in the Conference consider it essential that the
non-aligned countries should participate in solving outstanding international issues concerning peace and securtiy in the world as none of them
can remain unaffected by or indifferent to these issues.
They consider that the further extension of the noncommitted
area of the world constitutes the only possible and indispensable
alternative to the policy of total division of the world into blocs, and
intensification of cold war policies. The non-aligned countries provide
encouragement and support to all peoples fighting for their independence
and equality.
The participants in the Conference are convinced that the
emergence of newly-liberated countries will further assist in narrowing
of the area of bloc antagonisms and thus encourage all tendencies aimed
at strengthening peace and promoting peaceful co-operation among
independent and equal nations.
1. The participants in the Conference solemnly reaffirm their
support to the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples," adopted at the 15th Session of the General
Assembly of the United Nations and recommend the immediate unconditional, total and final abolition of colonialism and resolve to make
a concerted effort to put an end to all types of new colonialism and
imperialist domination in all its forms and manifestations.
2. The participants in the Conference demand that an immediate
stop be put to armed action and repressive measures of any kind
directed against dependent peoples to enable them to exercise peacefully
and freely their right to complete independence and that the integrity
of their national territory should be respected. Any aid given by any
country to a colonial power in such suppression is contrary to the
Charter of the United Nations. The participating countries respecting
scrupulously the territorial integrity of all states oppose by all means
any aims of annexation by other nations.

3. The participating countries consider the struggle of the people
of Algeria for freedom, self-determination and independence, and for
the integrity of its national territory including the Sahara, to be just
and necessary and are, therefore, determined to extend to the people
of Algeria all the possible support and aid. The Heads of State or
Government are particularly gratified that Algeria is represented at this
Conference by its rightful representative, the Prime Minister of the
Provisional Government of Algeria.
4. The participating countries draw attention with great concern
to the developments in Angola and to the intolerable measures of
repression taken by the Portuguese colonial authorities against the
people of Angola and demand that an immediate end should be put
to any further shedding of blood of the Angolan people, and the people
of Angola should be assisted by all peace-loving countries, particularly
member states of the United Nations, to establish their free and independent state without delay.

5. The participants in the Conference demand the immediate
termination of all colonial occupation and the restoration of the
territorial integrity to the rightful people in countries in which it has
been violated in Asia, Africa and Latin America as well as the withdrawal of foreign forces from their national soil.
6. The participating countries demand the immediate evacuation
of French armed forces from the whole of the Tunisian territory in
accordance with the legitimate right of Tunisia to the exercise of its
full national sovereignty.
7. The participating countries demand that the tragic events in
the Congo must not be repeated and they feel that it is the duty of the
world community to continue to do everything in its power in order
to erase the consequences and to prevent any further foreign intervention
in this young African state, and to enable the Congo to embark freely
upon the road of its independent development based on respect for its
sovereignty, unity and its territorial integrity.
8. The participants in the Conference resolutely condemn the
policy of apartheid practiced by the Union of South Africa and demand
the immediate abandonment of this policy. They further state that the
policy of racial discrimination anywhere in the world constitutes a
grave violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
9. The participating countries declare solemnly the absolute respect
of the rights of ethnic or religious minorities to be protected in particular against crimes of genocide or any other violation of their
fundamental human rights.

10. The participants in the Conference condemn the imperialist
policies pursued in the Middle East, and declare their support for the
full restoration of all the rights of the Arab people of Palestine in
conformity with the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations.
11. The participating countries consider the establishment and
maintenance of foreign military bases in the territories of other countries, particularly against their express will, a gross violation of the
sovereignty of such States. They declare their full support to countries
who are endeavoring to secure the vacation of these bases. They call
upon those countries maintaining foreign bases to consider seriously
their abolition as a contribution to world peace.

12. They also acknowledge that the North American military
base at Guantanamo, Cuba, to the permanence of which the Government
and people of Cuba have expressed their opposition, affects the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country.
13. The participants in the Conference reaffirm their conviction
that: a) All nations have the right of unity, self-determination, and
independence by virtue of which right they can determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development
without intimidation or hindrance. b) All peoples may, for their own
ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without
prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international
law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence. The participating countries believe that the right of Cuba as
that of any other nation to freely choose their political and social
systems in accordance with their own conditions, needs and possibilities
should be respected.

14. The participating countries express their determination that
no intimidation, interference or intervention should be brought to bear
in the exercise of the right of self-determination of peoples, including
their right to pursue constructive and independent policies for the
attainment and preservation of their sovereignty.
15. The participants in the Conference consider that disarmament
is an imperative need and the most urgent task of mankind. A radical
solution of this problem, which has become an urgent necessity in the
present state of armaments, in the unanimous view of participating
countries, can be achieved only by means of a general, complete and
strictly and internationally controlled disarmament.

16. The Heads of State or Government point out that general and
complete disarmament should include the elimination of armed forces,
armaments, foreign bases, manufacture of arms as well as elimination

of institutions and installations for military training, except for purposes
of internal security; and the total prohibition of the production,
possession and utilization of nuclear and thermo-nuclear arms,
bacteriological and chemical weapons as well as the elimination of
equipment and installations for the delivery and placement and operational use of weapons of mass destruction on national territories.
17. The participating countries call upon all States in general,
and States exploring outer space at present in particular, to undertake
to use outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. They express the
hope that the international community will, through collective action,
establish an international agency with a view to promote and coordinate
the human actions in the field of international cooperation in the
peaceful uses of outer space.
18. The participants in the Conference urge the Great Powers to
sign without further delay a treaty for general and complete disarmament
in order to save mankind from the scourge of war and to release
energy and resources now being spent on armaments to be used for the
peaceful economic and social development of all mankind. The participating countries also consider that: (a) The non-aligned Nations
should be represented at all future world conferences on disarmament;
(b) All discussions on disarmament should be held under the auspices
of the United Nations; (c) General and complete disarmament should
be guaranteed by an efFective system of inspection and control, the
teams of which should include members of non-aligned Nations.
19. The participants in the Conference consider it essential that
an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests
should be urgently concluded. With this aim in view, it is necessary
that negotiations be immediately resumed, separately or as part of the
negotiations on general disarmament. Meanwhile, the moratorium on
the testing of all nuclear weapons should be resumed and observed by
all countries.
20. The participants in the Conference recommend that the
General Assembly of the United Nations should, at its forthcoming
session, adopt a decision on the convening either of a sp.ecia1 session
of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to discussion
of disarmament or on the convening of a world disarmament conference
under the auspices of the United Nations with a view to setting in
motion the process of general disarmament.
21. The participants in the Conference consider that efforts should
be made to remove economic imbalance inherited from colonialism and
imperialism. They consider it necessary to close, through accelerated
economic, industrial and agricultural development, the ever-widening
gap in the standards of living between the few economically advanced

countries and the many economically less-developed countries. The
participants in the Conference recommend the immediate establishment
and operation of a United Nations Capital Development Fund. They
further agree to demand fair terms of trade for the economically lessdeveloped countries and, in particular, constructive efforts to eliminate
the excessive fluctuations in primary commodity trade and the restrictive
measures and practices which adversely affect the trade and revenues
of the newly-developing counuies. In general, they demand that the fruits
of the scientific and technological revolution be applied in all fields of
economic development to hasten the achievement of international social
justice.
22. The participating countries invite all the countries in the
course of development to co-operate effectively in the economic and
commercial fields so as to face the policies of pressure in the economic
sphere, as well as the harmful results which may be created by the
economic blocs of the industrial countries. They invite all the counuies
concerned to consider to convene, as soon as possible, an international
conference to discuss their common problems and to reach an agreement
on the ways and means of repelling all damage which may hinder their
development; and to discuss and agree upon the most dective measures
to ensure the realization of their economic and social development.
23. The countries participating in the Conference declare that the
recipient countries must be free to determine the use of the economic
and technical assistance which they receive, and to draw up their own
plans and assign priorities in accordance with their needs.
24. The participating countries consider it essential that the
General Assembly of the United Nations should, through the revision
of the Charter, find a solution to the question of expanding the membership of the Security Council and of the Economic and Social Council
in order to bring the composition and work of these two most important
organs of the General Assembly into harmony with the needs of the
Organization and with the expanded membership of the United Nations.
25. The unity of the World Organization and the assuring of
the efficiency of its work make it absolutely necessary to evolve a more
appropriate structure for the Secretariat of the United Nations, bearing
in mind equitable regional distribution.
26. Those of the countries participating in the Conference who
recognize the Government of the People's Republic of China recommend
that the General Assembly in its forthcoming Session should accept the
representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China
as the only legitimate representatives of that country in the United
Nations.
27. The countries participating in the Conference consider that

the German problem is not merely a regional problem but liable to
exercise a decisive influence on the course of future developments in
international relations. Concerned at the developments which have led
to the present acute aggravation of the situation in regard to Germany
and Berlin, the participating countries call upon all parties concerned
not to resort to or threaten the use of force to solve the German question
or the problem of Berlin, in accordance with the appeal made by the
Heads of State or Governments on September 6, 1961.
The Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries
resolve that this Declaration should be forwarded to the United Nations
and brought to the attention of all the Member States of the World
Organization. The present Declaration will be also forwarded to all
the other States.

DOCUMENT 3. Letter Addressed to President Kennedy (and Premier
Khrushchev).

Your Excellency,
We, the Heads of States and Governments of our respective
countries attending the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries held at
Belgrade from September 1 to September 6, 1961, venture to address
Your Excellency on a subject of vital and immediate importance to all
of us and to the world as a whole. W e do so not only on our own
behalf, but at the unanimous desire of the Conference and of our
peoples.
W e are distressed and deeply concerned at the deterioration in the
international situation and the prospect of war which now threatens
humanity. Your Excellency has often pointed to the terrible nature of
modern war and the use of nuclear weapons, which may well destroy
humanity, and has pleaded for the maintenance of world peace.
Yet we are at the brink of this very danger that menaces the world
and humanity. W e are fully aware that Your Excellency is anxious as
any of us to avoid this dreadful development which will not only end
the hopes that we all have cherished for the advancement of our peoples
but is a challenge to human survival. W e are certain that Your
Excellency will do everything in your power to avert such a calamity.
Having regard, however, to the gravity of the crisis that menaces
the world and the urgent need to avert the developments that may
precipitate it, we take the liberty of urging on the Great Powers
concerned that negotiations should be resumed and pursued so that the
danger of war might be removed from the world and mankind adopts
ways of peace. In particular, we earnestly request for direct negotiations
between Your Excellency and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers

of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,l who represent the two most
powerful nations today and in whose hands lies the key to peace or
war. We feel convinced that devoted as both of you are to world peace,
your efforts through persistent negotiations will lead to a way out of
the present impasse and enable the world and humanity to work and
live for prosperity and peace.
W e feel sure that Your Excellency will appreciate that this letter
is written because of our love of peace and our horror of war and the
compelling desire that a way out must be found before mankind is
faced with a terrible disaster.
We are sending a letter 'in identical terms to this to His Excellency,
N. S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics.*
With assurance of our deep regard,
Yours sincerely?

Belgrade, Septembev 6, 1961

DOCUMENT 4. Letter from President John F. Kennedy to President
Modibo Keita and President Sukarno.

September 13,1961
Dear Mr. President:
I have studied with care the message from the conference of nonaligned nations which you were good enough to present in person. The
United States Government is aware that the non-aligned powers
assembled at Belgrade represent an important segment of world opinion,
and, especially, that their peoples share with ours a vital stake in the
maintenance of the peace. In our continuing deliberations within the
United States Government and with our allies, we will give the message
from the conference most careful consideration.
1. In the letter to M,r. Khrushchev, the phrase is substituted, "and the President of the United States.
2. In the letter to Mr. Khrushchev, the phrase is substituted, "to His Excellency Mr. John F. Kennedy, President of the United States of America."
3. The original draft of the letter was signed by Prime Minister Daud,
Prime Minister Khedda, Prime Minister U Nu, Prince Sihanouk, Prime Minister
Bandaranaike, Premier Adoula, President Dorticos, and President Makarios. It
was drafted and signed on September 6, 1961, when some of the heads of state
had already left Belgrade. A later draft of the letter was published signed by all
heads of state or government or heads of delegations attending the Conference.

As regards the proposal that I enter into direct negotiations with
Premier Khrushchev, we are prepared to use existing and appropriate
channels to establish the possibility of surmounting the present impasse.
It has been and continues to be our policy to seek to settle our
problems with others by peaceful means. W e have not attempted to
create crises, and we believe it is incumbent upon all responsible governments to explore all possible avenues, including negotiations at the
highest levels, for mutually acceptable solutions of current international
problems.
However, unless such negotiations are carefully prepared beforehand they risk failure and may lead to deterioration of the situation.
W e therefore feel that at a time of great tension it is particularly
necessary that negotiations of the kind proposed by the Belgrade Conference not only have careful preparation but also a reasonable chance of
success. . . .
The channels of diplomacy are open for the exploration of constructive steps toward a reduction of tension. Other means are available
when they can serve a useful purpose. Meanwhile, it is clearly of the
utmost importance that there be no unilateral acts which will make
peaceful progress impossible.
Given a realistic approach and a sincere desire on the other side
as well as ours to reach a mutually acceptable solution, we see no reason
why eventual negotiations should not be successful in coping with the
present crisis. However, we do not intend to enter into negotiations
under ultimata or threats. It is also clear that we do not propose to
discuss either abdication of our responsibility or renunciation of the
modalities for carrying out those responsibilities.
Nevertheless, we believe it possible to find a solution which can
accommodate vital interests on both sides of the crisis.
The United States has carefully noted the statements in the Belgrade
declaration recognizing that the Berlin and German situations are of
vital importance to future developments in international relations. It
has consistently been, and will continue to be, our policy to settle
differences with realism and responsibility.
W e would note that this crisis has been initiated by Soviet, not
by American action. W e endorse the declaration's reference to the right
of all nations to unity, self-determination, and independence, and its
condemnation of intimidation, intervention, and interference in the
exercise of the right of self-determination. W e presume that these
principles apply equally to the people of Germany and Berlin.
Our policies in this area have sought to respect these principles.
W e have absolutely no intention of resorting to force or threats of
force to solve the Berlin and German problems, but we are determined

to honor our commitments and are prepared to meet force with force
if it is used against us.
While the United States and its allies are all agreed there must
be negotiations on the problem, the Soviet Union must give indication
of a readiness to engage in discussion based on mutual respect. The
only conditions it has yet exhibited any willingness to consider are
conditions which involve the surrender of Western rights.
The United States continues to believe that conclusion of an
adequately controlled test ban agreement is a matter of greatest urgency.
We wish to reafKrm, however, our belief that test ban negotiations
should be resumed separately from negotiations on general and complete
disarmament. The Soviet resumption of atmospheric testing has increased
the urgency which attaches to the signature of a complete treaty test
ban. Complex negotiation on general disarmament should not be
permitted to delay the achievement of this significant step forward.
I would emphasize again my regret that the Soviet Union has
rejected the offer of the United Kingdom and the United States Government to halt atmospheric tests creating fallout.
Only after a searching review of vital United States security
interests and after the utmost provocation did we announce our intention
to resume underground tests. The non-aligned nations may be assured
of our continued willingness to negotiate an effective treaty; but,
meanwhile, the national security interests of our country and of our
allies in the free world must be protected. .
The United States is pleased to note that the participants in the
recent conference in Belgrade mentioned the importance of an effective
system of inspection and control. This is the crux of the matter. It is
clear from United States proposals in the nuclear test negotiations
that the United States contemplates inspection and control procedures
in the disarmament field in which the non-aligned countries, as well
as others, would participate.
For some months the United States has been conducting an
intensive study of the problem of general disarmament which resulted
in a request to Congress to create a disarmament agency. The
study has also resulted in the development of a comprehensive plan for
general and complete disarmament which is in the final stage of
preparations for public presentation.
This plan provides for a program which will insure that the
disarmament is general and complete; that war is no longer an instrument for settling international disputes; and that disarmament is
accompanied by the creation of reliable procedures for peaceful settlement of disputes and maintenance of peace in accordance with the
principles of the United Nations Charter. .

. .

..

Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union resumed
Sept. 6 in New York in a further effort to bring the two sides closer
together and to work out a satisfactory disarmament forum. The
proposals put forth by the United States by these talks provides for
participation of non-aligned countries in future broad disarmament
negotiations. They also provide for negotiations under the auspices of
the United Nations if the Soviet Union will agree. . . .
In conclusion, let me say, Mr. President, that we found elements
in the message and in the declaration which reflected a genuine desire
to bring about a relaxation of tensions and which, if applied in a truly
neutral and objective manner, could be of positive benefit in easing
world tensions.
We respect, as always, the desire of other nations to remain nonaligned. We understand with sympathy and share their passion for
peace. We are, as always, prepared to cooperate with all initiatives to
bring about an improvement in the world situation. We look forward
to continued friendly relations with the Government and peoples
participating in the Belgrade meeting.

DOCUMENT 5. Letter from Premier Khrushchev to Prime Minister
Nehru.

September 16, 1961
Esteemed Mr. Prime Minister,
I have studied with close attention and interest the letter from
the recently ended conference of the heads of state and government
of twenty-five non-aligned nations and I am deeply touched that you
took the trouble to bring it to Moscow and deliver it to me in person.
I express heartfelt gratitude to all distinguished Conference participants
for this letter. It is gratifying that the views of the Soviet Government
on the obtaining world situation coincide in many respects with the
considerations set forth in the letter from the Conference participants.
I was also favorably impressed by the other Conference documents full
of concern for the destinies of the world.
How can one fail to rejoice that the governments of neutral
states, whose population comprises a third of mankind, have lifted their
voice in defense of peace and resolutely denounce the policy of war
preparations. This will be of the greater importance for world developments since struggle to prevent war and consolidate peace was and
remains the backbone of the entire foreign policy of the Socialist states,
which compose another third of mankind.
This is how broad the circle of states which regard concern for
peace as their vital cause has become.

The Conference's insistent call for the immediate conclusion of a
treaty on general and complete disarmament will unquestionably attract
the attention of all people. Yes, it is indeed the most pressing and urgent
matter, as it is in it that we have a reliable key to stable peace on earth.
The Soviet Government regards with great respect the Conference's
considerations and conclusions on a number of other international
questions, including the question of complete and final liquidation of
colonialism. It can now be confidently said that soon, very soon, the
pressure of joint forces of the peoples will break the resistance of states
clinging to their colonial possessions which have served them for decades
as a source of enrichment, but only because the colonialists robbed
and brutally exploited the colonial peoples. The sweat and blood of
these peoples-such is the source of the wealth of the colonial powers.
The day is near when colonialism will be forever wiped off the face
of the earth.
In the letter delivered to me the Conference participants expressed
deep concern over the aggravation of the international situation and the
danger of war. The Soviet Government fully shares this concern. In all
the postwar period the threat of war has never, perhaps, been felt as
keenly as today. As you are well aware, of course, this state of affairs
has not come of itself. It is a result of the activities of definite forces
which are interested in anything but stable peace.
One cannot escape the thought that the policy of the NATO
powers is being increasingly influenced by circles which simply seek
war, push to war. They apparently realize that time works against the
old imperialist system founded on domination and oppression, on flouting the basic rights of the peoples, and are considering if the time
has not come to stake everything on an attempt to stop by war the
great shifts that are taking place in the life of the peoples throughout
the world, and especially on the continents which only yesterday
groaned under the whip of the colonial overseers.
This conclusion imposes when you see that the governments of
the Western powers intensify military preparations in every way,
increase the already inflated military budgets, call up reservists, and
instill among the population of their countries a spirit of militarism
of which there is already too much in some NATO powers. It appears
that these countries are not averse to using for a general showdown the
central question which brooks no delay-the question of a German
peace treaty whose conclusion would radically improve the situation in
Europe considering the actual situation which has developed in Germany
in connection with the formation of two sovereign German states, and
would render a serious service to the cause of universal peace. . . .
I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to declare that
we are deeply convinced that the measures we have taken are in the

interests not only of the Soviet people, of our allies, who like ourselves,
defend the cause of peace, the need of drawing a line under World War
I1 and concluding a German peace treaty for this purpose, but also in the
interests of all other peoples who crave a peaceful life. W e express
satisfaction with the fact that, on the whole, our defensive measures have
been understood correctly by most broad public circles in many countries.
I should like to tell you openly and frankly, although that will
be no news to you, that the Soviet Union would not like to follow in
the rut of military rivalry with the Western powers. This is not our
policy, this is not our road and we should not like to follow along
this road unless forced to do so. Our greatest and most sacred desire
is to live in friendship with all states, to live in a world without wars.
It is for this reason that we are demanding so persistently that statesmen
responsible for the destinies of the world take the only correct decision:
to put an end to remnants of the Second World War, to smash completely the war machinery of states, destroy all armaments, including
nuclear weapons which would finally remove the question of nuclear
weapons tests; both of these questions are bound up organically,
inseparably and can be solved only simultaneously. It is this that I tried
to stress in every way during my recent meeting with President Kennedy
in Vienna.
In their letter the participants in the conference of noncommitted
nations urge negotiations between the great powers to remove the
danger of war. In particular they suggest direct talks between the
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the President
of the United States of America.
What can one say to that? You know, of course, that the Soviet
Union always stood for a negotiated settlement of outstanding issues.
Naturally now too we believe that talks between states, especially
between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, as the mightiest,and most
influential countries, can and must play an important role in cleansing
the international atmosphere. In the name of insuring peace we are
ready for talks any time, any place and at any level.
The need has been ripe for a long time for statesmen of nations
which fought against Hitler Germany to sit down at a peace conference
table and together with representatives of both German states, in a calm
atmosphere, without stirring up passions, work out a peace treaty which
would quench the smouldering embers left after the world conflagration
which raged a decade and a half ago. These do exist, and not just
anywhere but in the center of Europe from which spread that conflagration in whose flames tens of millions of people had perished. We,
the Soviet people, better than anyone else know what this tragedy had
cost and how many human lives it carried away.
It goes without saying that negotiations on mature international

problems are needed and we have said so on more than one occasion.
But they are needed not for the negotiations' sake. Bitter experience
has taught us to speak about this straight. Talks would be useful only
if statesmen go to these talks with a serious desire and readiness to
achieve agreements which would represent a basis for strengthening
peace. The participants in the talks must have courage to face realities
and clearly realize that no one can turn the tide of events which reflect
the national development of human society.
One has to speak about this because some Western leaders are not
averse to striking attitudes even when most serious matters are at stake:
'*Just look at us, how we do not let ourselves listen to reason." Is it not
a fact that certain Western leaders keep interspersing their statements
with utterances to the effect that they are holding tough positions and
savor this word "tough" in every way?
. . . I want you to get me right. The Soviet Government is ready to
take part in negotiations which would be really aimed toward the
speediest solution of pressing international problems, in the fist turn
in a peace conference on the question of concluding of a German peace
treaty and normalizing the situation in West Berlin on this basis. It is
convinced that the sooner such serious negotiations start the better it
would be. It would be an expression of great statesmanship if such a
treaty was concluded on an agreed basis at the earliest date.
To strengthen peace and normalize the situation in Europe and
throughout the world it would be a good thing if other countries which
have not recognized yet both German states-the German Democratic
Republic {East Germany] and the Federal Republic of Germany-would
recognize them de jure, establish relations with them. The admission
of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of
Germany to the United Nations would serve the same purpose.
AlI this would raise a serious barrier to revenge-seeking circles
in West Germany which, as it is known, are rallying forces to change
the conditions which have arisen after World War 11.
The entry of both German states into the United Nations and the
establishment of relations with them would fix the situation which exists
in Germany and that would be a great contribution to the cause of
strengthening world peace.
Allow me, Mr. Prime Minister, to express once more satisfaction
over the efforts which you personally, together with leading statesmen
of other noncommitted nations, are making to cleanse the international
atmosphere. I should like to assure you that faithful to its policy of
peace, the Soviet Government, for its part, will continue to spare no
efforts to enable the peoples to live without fear of war, in conditions
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of peace and prosperity.

